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Gregor Jr. BASEDIR=/ CLASSES=none 07070100016268000081a400000064000000640000000133040ec200000711000000200000001b00000000000000000000000700000009pkgmap: 1 636 1 d none /etc/opt/WZVwrap 0755 root root 1 d none /opt/WZVwrap 0555 root root 1 f none /opt/WZVwrap/README.solaris 0444 root root 987 18852 855903777 1 d none /opt/WZVwrap/doc 0555 root root 1 f none /opt/WZVwrap/doc/CHANGES 0444 root root 18694 17785 855709999 1 f none /opt/WZVwrap/doc/DISCLAIMER 0444 root root 792 63261 824054483 1 f none /opt/WZVwrap/doc/README 0444 root root 48006 23482 855710001 1 f none /opt/WZVwrap/doc/README.NIS 0444 root root 6680 8728 824055893 1 d none /opt/WZVwrap/include 0555 root root 1 f none /opt/WZVwrap/include/tcpd.h 0444 root root 7874 65415 827248945 1 d none /opt/WZVwrap/lib 0555 root root 1 f none /opt/WZVwrap/lib/libwrap.a 0444 root root 47780 52955 855901358 1 d none /opt/WZVwrap/man 0555 root root 1 d none /opt/WZVwrap/man/man3 0555 root root 1 f none /opt/WZVwrap/man/man3/hosts_access.3 0444 root root 3602 60445 824054487 1 d none /opt/WZVwrap/man/man5 0555 root root 1 f none /opt/WZVwrap/man/man5/hosts_access.5 0444 root root 15225 48898 791491907 1 f none /opt/WZVwrap/man/man5/hosts_options.5 0444 root root 6655 2415 788632949 1 d none /opt/WZVwrap/man/man8 0555 root root 1 f none /opt/WZVwrap/man/man8/tcpd.8 0444 root root 7022 39217 824917156 1 f none /opt/WZVwrap/man/man8/tcpdchk.8 0444 root root 2570 34688 789580831 1 f none /opt/WZVwrap/man/man8/tcpdmatch.8 0444 root root 3252 28719 824054496 1 d none /opt/WZVwrap/sbin 0555 root root 1 f none /opt/WZVwrap/sbin/safe_finger 0555 root root 8572 26898 855901381 1 f none /opt/WZVwrap/sbin/tcpd 0555 root root 33960 45491 855901361 1 f none /opt/WZVwrap/sbin/tcpdchk 0555 root root 33524 33765 855901388 1 f none /opt/WZVwrap/sbin/tcpdmatch 0555 root root 33980 41601 855901373 1 f none /opt/WZVwrap/sbin/try-from 0555 root root 21276 61640 855901377 1 i pkginfo 174 13819 855903937 07070100017135000041ed00000064000000640000000333040ec300000000000000200000001b00000000000000000000000500000009root0707010000005c000041ed00000064000000640000000333040ec300000000000000200000001b00000000000000000000000900000009root/opt07070100000f40000041ed00000064000000640000000733040ec400000000000000200000001b00000000000000000000001100000009root/opt/WZVwrap07070100000f42000081a400000064000000640000000133040e21000003db000000200000001b00000000000000000000002000000009root/opt/WZVwrap/README.solarisThis is Wietse Venema's TCP Wrappers package compiled for Solaris 2.5(.1). A standard compile was done, except for the following changes: (1) The syslog facility was change to LOG_AUTH (2) NETGROUP was turned on (3) KILL_IP_OPTIONS (ie, no source routing) was turned on (4) SYSV TLI was enabled (5) The hosts.allow and hosts.deny are put in /etc/opt/WZVwrap (6) The 'Advanced' configuration method was chosen -- to use this, you edit /etc/inet/inetd.conf. See doc/README for more info. You can find the man pages under the 'man/' in this directory. All of the non-man page documents are in 'doc/'. The README file is an excellent document on TCP wrappers, and has a bit of information on other security methods and tools. This package was made by Daniel J. Gregor Jr., . Please address questions, comments, or bugs my way. I will also happily provide the patches that I used to make this package to anyone who asks. Have fun, and keep secure! - djg 07070100003b61000041ed00000064000000640000000233040ec300000000000000200000001b00000000000000000000001500000009root/opt/WZVwrap/doc07070100003b62000081a40000006400000064000000013301192f00004906000000200000001b00000000000000000000001d00000009root/opt/WZVwrap/doc/CHANGESRequest: after building the programs, please run the `tcpdchk' wrapper configuration checker. See the `tcpdchk.8' manual page (`nroff -man' format) for instructions. `tcpdchk' automatically identifies the most common configuration problems, and will save you and me a lot of time. Changes per release 7.5 (Feb 1997) ================================== - Optionally refuse source-routed TCP connections requests altogether. Credits to Niels Provos of Universitaet Hamburg. File: fix_options.c. - Support for IRIX 6 (Lael Tucker). - Support for Amdahl UTS 2.1.5 (Richard E. Richmond). - Support for SINIX 5.42 (Klaus Nielsen). - SCO 5 now has vsyslog() (Bill Golden). - Hints and tips for dealing with IRIX inetd (Niko Makila, Aaron M Lee). - Support for BSD/OS (Paul Borman). - Support for Tandem (Emad Qawas). - Support for ISC (Frederick B. Cohen). - Workaround for UNICOS - it would choke on a setjmp() expression (Bruce Kelly). File: hosts_access.c, tcpdchk.c. - Increased the level of buffer overflow paranoia when printing unwanted IP options. File: fix_options.c. Changes per release 7.4 (Mar 1996) ================================== - IRIX 5.3 (and possibly, earlier releases, too) library routines call the non-reentrant strtok() routine. The result is that hosts may slip through allow/deny filters. Workaround is to not rely on the vendor's strtok() routine (#ifdef LIBC_CALLS_STRTOK). Credits to Th. Eifert (Aachen University) for spotting this one. This fix supersedes the earlier workaround for a similar problem in FreeBSD 2.0. Changes per release 7.3 (Feb 1996) ================================== - More tests added to tcpdchk and tcpdmatch: make sure that the REAL_DAEMON_DIR actually is a directory and not a regular file; detect if tcpd recursively calls itself. - Edwin Kremer found an amusing fencepost error in the xgets() routine: lines longer than BUFLEN characters would be garbled. - The access control routines now refuse to execute "dangerous" actions such as `twist' when they are called from within a resident process. This prevents you from shooting yourself into the foot with critical systems programs such as, e.g., portmap or rpcbind. - Support for Unicos 8.x (Bruce Kelly). The program now closes the syslog client socket before running the real daemon: Cray UNICOS refuses to checkpoint processes with open network ports. - Support for MachTen UNIX (Albert M.C Tam). - Support for Interactive UNIX R3.2 V4.0 (Bobby D. Wright). - Support for SCO 3.2v5.0.0 OpenServer 5 (bob@odt.handy.com) - Support for Unixware 1.x and Unixware 2.x. The old Unixware Makefile rule was broken. Sorry about that. - Some FreeBSD 2.0 libc routines call strtok() and severely mess up the allow/deny rule processing. This is very bad. Workaround: call our own strtok() clone (#ifdef USE_STRSEP). - The programs now log a warning when they detect that a non-existent banner directory is specified. - The hosts_access.3 manual page used obsolete names for the RQ_* constants. Changes per release 7.2 (Jan 1995) ================================== - Added a note to the README and manpages on using the IDENT service to detect sequence number spoofing and other host impersonation attacks. - Portability: ConvexOS puts RPC version numbers before the daemon path name (Jukka Ukkonen). - Portability: the AIX compiler disliked the strchr() declaration in socket.c. I should have removed it when I included . - Backwards compatibility: some people relied on the old leading dot or trailing dot magic in daemon process names. - Backwards compatibility: hostname lookup remains enabled when -DPARANOID is turned off. In order to disable hostname lookups you must turn off -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME. - Eliminated false complaints from the tcpdmatch/tcpdchk configuration checking programs about process names not in inetd.conf or about KNOWN username patterns. Changes per release 7.1 (Jan 1995) ================================== - Portability: HP-UX permits you to break inetd.conf entries with backslash-newline. - Portability: EP/IX has no putenv() and some inetd.conf entries are spread out over two lines. - Portability: SCO with NIS support has no *netgrent() routines. Changes per release 7.0 (Jan 1995) ================================== - Added a last-minute workaround for a Solaris 2.4 gethostbyname() foulup with multi-homed hosts in DNS through NIS mode. - Added a last-minute defense against TLI weirdness: address lookups apparently succeed but the result netbuf is empty (ticlts transport). - Dropped several new solutions that were in need of a problem. Beta testers may recognize what new features were kicked out during the last weeks before release 7.0 came out. Such is life. - Got rid of out the environment replacement routines, at least for most architectures. One should not have to replace working system software when all that is needed is a 4.4BSD setenv() emulator. - By popular request I have added an option to send banner messages to clients. There is a Banners.Makefile that gives some aid for sites that are going to use this feature. John C. Wingenbach did some pioneering work here. I used to think that banners are frivolous. Now that I had a personal need for them I know that banners can be useful. - At last: an extensible functional interface to the pattern matching engine. request_init() and request_set() accept a variable-length name-value argument list. The result can be passed to hosts_access(). - When PARANOID mode is disabled (compile time), the wrapper does no hostname lookup or hostname double checks unless required by %letter expansions, or by access control rules that match host names. This is useful for sites that don't care about internet hostnames anyway. Inspired by the authors of the firewalls and internet security book. - When PARANOID mode is disabled (compile time), hosts with a name/name or name/address conflict can be matched with the PARANOID host wildcard pattern, so that you can take some intelligent action instead of just dropping clients. Like showing a banner that explains the problem. - New percent escapes: %A expands to the server address; %H expands to the corresponding hostname (or address if no name is available); %n and %N expand to the client and server hostname (or "unknown"); %s expands to everything we know about the server endpoint (the opposite of the %c sequence for client information). - Symmetry: server and client host information is now treated on equal footing, so that we can reuse a lot of code. - Lazy evaluation of host names, host addresses, usernames, and so on, to avoid doing unnecessary work. - Dropping #ifdefs for some archaic systems made the code simpler. - Dropping the FAIL pattern made the pattern matcher much simpler. Run the "tcpdchk" program to scan your access control files for any uses of this obscure language feature. - Moving host-specific pattern matching from string_match() to the host_match() routine made the code more accurate. Run the "tcpdchk" program to scan your access control files for any dependencies on undocumented or obscure language features that are gone. - daemon@host patterns trigger on clients that connect to a specific internet address. This can be useful for service providers that offer multiple ftp or www archives on different internet addresses, all belonging to one and the same host (www.foo.com, ftp.bar.com, you get the idea). Inspired by a discussion with Rop Gonggrijp, Cor Bosman, and Casper Dik, and earlier discussions with Adrian van Bloois. - The new "tcpdchk" program critcizes all your access control rules and inetd.conf entries. Great for spotting obscure bugs in my own hosts.xxx files. This program also detects hosts with name/address conflicts and with other DNS-related problems. See the "tcpdchk.8" manual page. - The "tcpdmatch" program replaces the poor old "try" command. The new program looks in your inetd.conf file and therefore produces much more accurate predictions. In addition, it detects hosts with name/address conflicts and with other DNS-related problems. See the "tcpdmatch.8" manual page. The inetd.conf lookup was suggested by Everett F Batey. - In the access control tables, the `=' between option name and value is no longer required. - Added 60-second timeout to the safe_finger command, to cover another potential problem. Suggested by Peter Wemm. - Andrew Maffei provided code that works with WIN-TCP on NCR System V.4 UNIX. It reportedly works with versions 02.02.01 and 02.03.00. The code pops off all streams modules above the device driver, pushes the timod module to get at the peer address, and then restores the streams stack to the initial state. Changes per release 6.3 (Mar 1994) ================================== - Keepalives option, to get rid of stuck daemons when people turn off their PC while still connected. Files: options.c, hosts_options.5. - Nice option, to calm down network daemons that take away too much CPU time. Files: options.c, hosts_options.5. - Ultrix perversion: the environ global pointer may be null. The environment replacement routines now check for this. File: environ.c. - Fixed a few places that still assumed the socket is on standard input. Fixed some error messages that did not provide access control file name and line number. File: options.c. - Just when I was going to release 6.2 I received code for Dynix/PTX. That code is specific to PTX 2.x, so I'll keep around my generic PTX code just in case. The difference is in the handling of UDP services. Files: tli_sequent.[hc]. Changes per release 6.2 (Feb 1994) ================================== - Resurrected my year-old code to reduce DNS load by appending a dot to the gethostbyname() argument. This feature is still experimental and it may go away if it causes more problems than it solves. File: socket.c. - Auxiliary code for the Pyramid, BSD universe. Karl Vogel figured out what was missing: yp_get_default_domain() and vfprintf(). Files: workarounds.c, vfprintf.c. - Improved support for Dynix/PTX. The wrapper should now be able to deal with all TLI over IP services. File: ptx.c. - The try command now uses the hostname that gethostbyaddr() would return, instead of the hostname returned by gethostbyname(). This can be significant on systems with NIS that have short host names in the hosts map. For example, gethostbyname("wzv.win.tue.nl") returns "wzv.win.tue.nl"; gethostbyaddr(131.155.210.17) returns "wzv", and that is what we should test with. File: try.c. Changes per release 6.1 (Dec 1993) ================================== - Re-implemented all environment access routines. Most systems have putenv() but no setenv(), some systems have setenv() but no putenv(), and there are even systems that have neither setenv() nor putenv(). The benefit of all this is that more systems can now be treated in the same way. File: environ.c. - Workaround for a weird problem with DG/UX when the wrapper is run as nobody (i.e. fingerd). For some reason the ioctl(fd, I_FIND, "sockmod") call fails even with socket-based applications. The "fix" is to always assume sockets when the ioctl(fd, I_FIND, "timod") call fails. File: fromhost.c. Thanks to Paul de Vries (vries@dutentb.et.tudelft.nl) for helping me to figure out this one. - Implemented a workaround for Dynix/PTX and other systems with TLI that lack some essential support routines. Thanks to Bugs Brouillard (brouill@hsuseq.humboldt.edu) for the hospitality to try things out. The trick is to temporarily switch to the socket API to identify the client, and to switch back to TLI when done. It still does not work right for basic network services such as telnet. File: fromhost.c. - Easy-to-build procedures for SCO UNIX, ConvexOS with UltraNet, EP/IX, Dynix 3.2, Dynix/PTX. File: Makefile. - Variable rfc931 timeout. Files: rfc931.c, options.c, log_tcp.h, try.c. - Further simplification of the rfc931 code. File: rfc931.c. - The fromhost() interface stinks: I cannot change that, but at least the from_sock() and from_tli() functions now accept a file descriptor argument. - Fixed a buglet: fromhost() would pass a garbage file descriptor to the isastream() call. - On some systems the finger client program lives in /usr/bsd. File: safe_finger.c. Changes per release 6.0 (Sept 1993) =================================== - Easy build procedures for common platforms (sun, ultrix, aix, hpux and others). - TLI support, System V.4 style (Solaris, DG/UX). - Username lookup integrated with the access control language. Selective username lookups are now the default (was: no username lookups). - A safer finger command for booby traps. This one solves a host of possible problems with automatic reverse fingers. Thanks, Borja Marcos (borjam@we.lc.ehu.es) for some inspiring discussions. - KNOWN pattern that matches hosts whose name and address are known. - Cleanup of diagnostics. Errors in access-control files are now shown with file name and line number. - With AIX 3.2, hostnames longer than 32 would be truncated. This caused hostname verification failures, so that service would be refused when paranoid mode was enabled. Found by: Adrian van Bloois (A.vanBloois@info.nic.surfnet.nl). - With some IRIX versions, remote username lookups failed because the fgets() library function does not handle partial read()s from sockets. Found by: Daniel O'Callaghan (danny@austin.unimelb.edu.au). - Added a DISCLAIMER document to help you satisfy legal departments. The extension language module has undergone major revisions and extensions. Thanks, John P. Rouillard (rouilj@ra.cs.umb.edu) for discussions, experiments, and for being a good guinea pig. The extensions are documented in hosts_options.5, and are enabled by editing the Makefile STYLE macro definition. - (Extension language) The ":" separator may now occur within options as long as it is protected with a backslash. A warning is issued when a rule ends on ":". - (Extension language) Better verification mode. When the `try' command is run, each option function now explains what it would do. - (Extension language) New "allow" and "deny" keywords so you can now have all rules within a single file. See "nroff -man hosts_options.5" for examples. - (Extension language) "linger" keyword to set the socket linger time (SO_LINGER). From: Marc Boucher . - (Extension language) "severity" keyword to turn the logging noise up or down. Many sites wanted a means to shut up the program; other sites wanted to emphasize specific events. Adapted from code contributed by Dave Mitchell . Changes per release 5.1 (Mar 1993) ================================== - The additional protection against source-routing attacks from hosts that pretend to have someone elses network address has become optional because it causes kernel panics with SunOS <= 4.1.3. Changes per release 5.0 (Mar 1993) ================================== - Additional protection against source-routing attacks from hosts that pretend to have someone elses network address. For example, the address of a trusted host within your own network. - The access control language has been extended with a simple but powerful operator that greatly simplifies the design of rule sets (ALL: .foo.edu EXCEPT dialup.foo.edu). Blank lines are permitted, and long lines can be continued with backslash-newline. - All configurable stuff, including path names, has been moved into the Makefile so that you no longer have to hack source code to just configure the programs. - Ported to Solaris 2. TLI-based applications not yet supported. Several workarounds for System V bugs. - A small loophole in the netgroup lookup code was closed, and the remote username lookup code was made more portable. - Still more documentation. The README file now provides tutorial sections with introductions to client, server, inetd and syslogd. Changes per release 4.3 (Aug 1992) ================================== - Some sites reported that connections would be rejected because localhost != localhost.domain. The host name checking code now special-cases localhost (problem reported by several sites). - The programs now report an error if an existing access control file cannot be opened (e.g. due to lack of privileges). Until now, the programs would just pretend that the access control file does not exist (reported by Darren Reed, avalon@coombs.anu.edu.au). - The timeout period for remote userid lookups was upped to 30 seconds, in order to cope with slow hosts or networks. If this is too long for you, adjust the TIMEOUT definition in file rfc931.c (problem reported by several sites). - On hosts with more than one IP network interface, remote userid lookups could use the IP address of the "wrong" local interface. The problem and its solution were discussed on the rfc931-users mailing list. Scott Schwartz (schwartz@cs.psu.edu) folded the fix into the rfc931.c module. - The result of % expansion (in shell commands) is now checked for stuff that may confuse the shell; it is replaced by underscores (problem reported by Icarus Sparry, I.Sparry@gdr.bath.ac.uk). - A portability problem was fixed that caused compile-time problems on a CRAY (problem reported by Michael Barnett, mikeb@rmit.edu.au). Changes per release 4.0 (Jun 1992) ================================== 1 - network daemons no longer have to live within a common directory 2 - the access control code now uses both the host address and name 3 - an access control pattern that supports netmasks 4 - additional protection against forged host names 5 - a pattern that matches hosts whose name or address lookup fails 6 - an operator that prevents hosts or services from being matched 7 - optional remote username lookup with the RFC 931 protocol 8 - an optional umask to prevent the creation of world-writable files 9 - hooks for access control language extensions 10 - last but not least, thoroughly revised documentation. Changes per release 3.0 (Oct 1991) ================================== Enhancements over the previous release are: support for datagram (UDP and RPC) services, and execution of shell commands when a (remote host, requested service) pair matches a pattern in the access control tables. Changes per release 2.0 (May 1991) ================================== Enhancements over the previous release are: protection against rlogin and rsh attacks through compromised domain name servers, optional netgroup support for systems with NIS (formerly YP), and an extension of the wild card patterns supported by the access control files. Release 1.0 (Jan 1991) 07070100003b63000081a4000000640000006400000001311e12d300000318000000200000001b00000000000000000000002000000009root/opt/WZVwrap/doc/DISCLAIMER/************************************************************************ * Copyright 1995 by Wietse Venema. All rights reserved. Some individual * files may be covered by other copyrights. * * This material was originally written and compiled by Wietse Venema at * Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands, in 1990, 1991, * 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted * provided that this entire copyright notice is duplicated in all such * copies. * * This software is provided "as is" and without any expressed or implied * warranties, including, without limitation, the implied warranties of * merchantibility and fitness for any particular purpose. ************************************************************************/ 07070100003b64000081a4000000640000006400000001330119310000bb86000000200000001b00000000000000000000001c00000009root/opt/WZVwrap/doc/README@(#) README 1.29 97/02/12 02:13:20 This is the 7.5 version of the TCP/IP daemon wrapper package. Thank you for using this program. If you like it, send me a postcard. My postal address is at the bottom of this file. Read the BLURB file for a brief summary of what is new. The CHANGES file gives a complete account of differences with respect to previous releases. Announcements of new releases of this software are posted to Usenet (comp.security.unix, comp.unix.admin), to the cert-tools mailing list, and to a dedicated mailing list. You can subscribe to the dedicated mailing list by sending an email message to majordomo@wzv.win.tue.nl with in the body (not subject): subscribe tcp-wrappers-announce. Table of contents ----------------- 1 - Introduction 2 - Disclaimer 3 - Tutorials 3.1 - How it works 3.2 - Where the logging information goes 4 - Features 4.1 - Access control 4.2 - Host name spoofing 4.3 - Host address spoofing 4.4 - Client username lookups 4.5 - Language extensions 4.6 - Multiple ftp/gopher/www archives on one host 4.7 - Banner messages 4.8 - Sequence number guessing 5 - Other works 5.1 - Related documents 5.2 - Related software 6 - Limitations 6.1 - Known wrapper limitations 6.2 - Known system software bugs 7 - Configuration and installation 7.1 - Easy configuration and installation 7.2 - Advanced configuration and installation 7.3 - Daemons with arbitrary path names 7.4 - Building and testing the access control rules 7.5 - Other applications 8 - Acknowledgements 1 - Introduction ---------------- With this package you can monitor and filter incoming requests for the SYSTAT, FINGER, FTP, TELNET, RLOGIN, RSH, EXEC, TFTP, TALK, and other network services. It supports both 4.3BSD-style sockets and System V.4-style TLI. Praise yourself lucky if you don't know what that means. The package provides tiny daemon wrapper programs that can be installed without any changes to existing software or to existing configuration files. The wrappers report the name of the client host and of the requested service; the wrappers do not exchange information with the client or server applications, and impose no overhead on the actual conversation between the client and server applications. Optional features are: access control to restrict what systems can connect to what network daemons; client user name lookups with the RFC 931 etc. protocol; additional protection against hosts that pretend to have someone elses host name; additional protection against hosts that pretend to have someone elses host address. The programs are very portable. Build procedures are provided for many common (and not so common) environments, and guidelines are provided in case your environment is not among them. Requirements are that network daemons are spawned by a super server such as the inetd; a 4.3BSD-style socket programming interface and/or System V.4-style TLI programming interface; and the availability of a syslog(3) library and of a syslogd(8) daemon. The wrappers should run without modification on any system that satisfies these requirements. Workarounds have been implemented for several common bugs in systems software. What to do if this is your first encounter with the wrapper programs: 1) read the tutorial sections for an introduction to the relevant concepts and terminology; 2) glance over the security feature sections in this document; 3) follow the installation instructions (easy or advanced). I recommend that you first use the default security feature settings. Run the wrappers for a few days to become familiar with their logs, before doing anything drastic such as cutting off access or installing booby traps. 2 - Disclaimer -------------- The wrapper programs rely on source address information obtained from network packets. This information is provided by the client host. It is not 100 percent reliable, although the wrappers do their best to expose forgeries. In the absence of cryptographic protection of message contents, and of cryptographic authentication of message originators, all data from the network should be treated with sound scepticism. THIS RESTRICTION IS BY NO MEANS SPECIFIC TO THE TCP/IP PROTOCOLS. 3 - Tutorials ------------- The tutorial sections give a gentle introduction to the operation of the wrapper programs, and introduce some of the terminology that is used in the remainder of the document: client, server, the inetd and syslogd daemons, and their configuration files. 3.1 - How it works ------------------ Almost every application of the TCP/IP protocols is based on a client- server model. For example, when a user invokes the telnet command to connect to one of your systems, a telnet server process is executed on the target host. The telnet server process connects the user to a login process. A few examples of client and server programs are shown in the table below: client server application -------------------------------- telnet telnetd remote login ftp ftpd file transfer finger fingerd show users The usual approach is to run one single daemon process that waits for all kinds of incoming network connections. Whenever a connection is established, this daemon (usually called inetd) runs the appropriate server program and goes back to sleep, waiting for other connections. The wrapper programs rely on a simple, but powerful mechanism. Instead of directly running the desired server program, the inetd is tricked into running a small wrapper program. The wrapper logs the client host name or address and performs some additional checks. When all is well, the wrapper executes the desired server program and goes away. The wrapper programs have no interaction with the client user (or with the client process). Nor do the wrappers interact with the server application. This has two major advantages: 1) the wrappers are application-independent, so that the same program can protect many kinds of network services; 2) no interaction also means that the wrappers are invisible from outside (at least for authorized users). Another important property is that the wrapper programs are active only when the initial contact between client and server is established. Once a wrapper has done its work there is no overhead on the client-server conversation. The simple mechanism has one major drawback: the wrappers go away after the initial contact between client and server processes, so the wrappers are of little use with network daemons that service more than one client. The wrappers would only see the first client attempt to contact such a server. The NFS mount daemon is a typical example of a daemon that services requests from multiple clients. See the section on related software for ways to deal with such server programs. There are two ways to use the wrapper programs: 1) The easy way: move network daemons to some other directory and fill the resulting holes with copies of the wrapper programs. This approach involves no changes to system configuration files, so there is very little risk of breaking things. 2) The advanced way: leave the network daemons alone and modify the inetd configuration file. For example, an entry such as: tftp dgram udp wait root /usr/etc/tcpd in.tftpd -s /tftpboot When a tftp request arrives, inetd will run the wrapper program (tcpd) with a process name `in.tftpd'. This is the name that the wrapper will use when logging the request and when scanning the optional access control tables. `in.tftpd' is also the name of the server program that the wrapper will attempt to run when all is well. Any arguments (`-s /tftpboot' in this particular example) are transparently passed on to the server program. For an account of the history of the wrapper programs, with real-life examples, see the section below on related documents. 3.2 - Where the logging information goes ---------------------------------------- The wrapper programs send their logging information to the syslog daemon (syslogd). The disposition of the wrapper logs is determined by the syslog configuration file (usually /etc/syslog.conf). Messages are written to files, to the console, or are forwarded to a @loghost. Some syslogd versions can even forward messages down a |pipeline. Older syslog implementations (still found on Ultrix systems) only support priority levels ranging from 9 (debug-level messages) to 0 (alerts). All logging information of the specified priority level or more urgent is written to the same destination. In the syslog.conf file, priority levels are specified in numerical form. For example, 8/usr/spool/mqueue/syslog causes all messages with priority 8 (informational messages), and anything that is more urgent, to be appended to the file /usr/spool/mqueue/syslog. Newer syslog implementations support message classes in addition to priority levels. Examples of message classes are: mail, daemon, auth and news. In the syslog.conf file, priority levels are specified with symbolic names: debug, info, notice, ..., emerg. For example, mail.debug /var/log/syslog causes all messages of class mail with priority debug (or more urgent) to be appended to the /var/log/syslog file. By default, the wrapper logs go to the same place as the transaction logs of the sendmail daemon. The disposition can be changed by editing the Makefile and/or the syslog.conf file. Send a `kill -HUP' to the syslogd after changing its configuration file. Remember that syslogd, just like sendmail, insists on one or more TABs between the left-hand side and the right-hand side expressions in its configuration file. Solaris 2.x note: the syslog daemon depends on the m4 macro processor. The m4 program is installed as part of the software developer packages. Trouble shooting note: when the syslogging does not work as expected, run the program by hand (`syslogd -d') and see what really happens. 4 - Features ------------ 4.1 - Access control -------------------- When compiled with -DHOSTS_ACCESS, the wrapper programs support a simple form of access control. Access can be controlled per host, per service, or combinations thereof. The software provides hooks for the execution of shell commands when an access control rule fires; this feature may be used to install "booby traps". For details, see the hosts_access.5 manual page, which is in `nroff -man' format. A later section describes how you can test your access control rules. Access control can also be used to connect clients to the "right" service. What is right may depend on the requested service, the origin of the request, and what host address the client connects to. Examples: (1) A gopher or www database speaks native language when contacted from within the country, otherwise it speaks English. (2) A service provider offers different ftp, gopher or www services with different internet hostnames from one host (section 4.6). Access control is enabled by default. It can be turned off by editing the Makefile, or by providing no access control tables. The install instructions below describe the Makefile editing process. The hosts_options.5 manual page (`nroff -man' format) documents an extended version of the access control language. The extensions are disabled by default. See the section below on language extensions. Later System V implementations provide the Transport Level Interface (TLI), a network programming interface that performs functions similar to the Berkeley socket programming interface. Like Berkeley sockets, TLI was designed to cover multiple protocols, not just Internet. When the wrapper discovers that the TLI interface sits on top of a TCP/IP or UDP/IP conversation it uses this knowledge to provide the same functions as with traditional socket-based applications. When some other protocol is used underneath TLI, the host address will be some universal magic cookie that may not even be usable for access control purposes. 4.2 - Host name spoofing ------------------------ With some network applications, such as RSH or RLOGIN, the client host name plays an important role in the authentication process. Host name information can be reliable when lookups are done from a _local_ hosts table, provided that the client IP address can be trusted. With _distributed_ name services, authentication schemes that rely on host names become more problematic. The security of your system now may depend on some far-away DNS (domain name server) outside your own control. The wrapper programs verify the client host name that is returned by the address->name DNS server, by asking for a second opinion. To this end, the programs look at the name and addresses that are returned by the name->address DNS server, which may be an entirely different host. If any name or address discrepancies are found, or if the second DNS opinion is not available, the wrappers assume that one of the two name servers is lying, and assume that the client host pretends to have someone elses host name. When compiled with -DPARANOID, the wrappers will always attempt to look up and double check the client host name, and will always refuse service in case of a host name/address discrepancy. This is a reasonable policy for most systems. When compiled without -DPARANOID, the wrappers by default still perform hostname lookup. You can match hosts with a name/address discrepancy with the PARANOID wildcard and decide whether or not to grant service. Automatic hostname verification is enabled by default. Automatic hostname lookups and verification can be turned off by editing the Makefile. The configuration and installation section below describes the Makefile editing process. 4.3 - Host address spoofing --------------------------- While host name spoofing can be found out by asking a second opinion, it is much harder to find out that a host claims to have someone elses network address. And since host names are deduced from network addresses, address spoofing is at least as effective as name spoofing. The wrapper programs can give additional protection against hosts that claim to have an address that lies outside their own network. For example, some far-away host that claims to be a trusted host within your own network. Such things are possible even while the impersonated system is up and running. This additional protection is not an invention of my own; it has been present for at least five years in the BSD rsh and rlogin daemons. Unfortunately, that feature was added *after* 4.3 BSD came out, so that very few, if any, UNIX vendors have adopted it. Our site, and many other ones, has been running these enhanced daemons for several years, and without any ill effects. When the wrapper programs are compiled with -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS, the programs refuse to service TCP connections with IP source routing options. If you are going to use this feature on SunOS 4.1.x you should apply patch 100804-03+ or 101790-something depending on your SunOS version. Otherwise you may experience "BAD TRAP" and "Data fault" panics when the getsockopt() system call is executed after a TCP RESET has been received. This is a kernel bug, it is not the fault of the wrappers. The feature is disabled by default. It can be turned on by editing the Makefile. The configuration and installation section below describes the Makefile editing process. UDP services do not benefit from this additional protection. With UDP, all you can be certain of is the network packet's destination address. 4.4 - Client username lookups ----------------------------- The protocol proposed in RFC 931 provides a means to obtain the client user name from the client host. The requirement is that the client host runs an RFC 931-compliant daemon. The information provided by such a daemon is not intended to be used for authentication purposes, but it can provide additional information about the owner of a TCP connection. The RFC 931 protocol has diverged into different directions (IDENT, TAP, RFC 1413). To add to the confusion, they all use the same network port. The daemon wrappers implement a common subset of the protocols. There are some limitations: the number of hosts that run an RFC 931 (or compatible) daemon is limited (but growing); client user name lookups do not work for datagram (UDP) services. More seriously, client user name lookups can cause noticeable delays with connections from non-UNIX PCs. Recent PC software seem to have fixed this (for example NCSA telnet). The wrappers use a 10-second timeout for RFC931 lookups, to accommodate slow networks and slow hosts. By default, the wrappers will do username lookup only when the access control rules require them to do so (via user@host client patterns, see the hosts_access.5 manual page) or when the username is needed for % expansions. You can configure the wrappers to always perform client username lookups, by editing the Makefile. The client username lookup timeout period (10 seconds default) can be changed by editing the Makefile. The installation sections below describe the Makefile editing process. On System V with TLI-based network services, client username lookups will be possible only when the underlying network protocol is TCP/IP. 4.5 - Language extensions ------------------------- The wrappers sport only a limited number of features. This is for a good reason: programs that run at high privilege levels must be easy to verify. And the smaller a program, the easier to verify. There is, however, a provision to add features. The options.c module provides a framework for language extensions. Quite a few extensions have already been implemented; they are documented in the hosts_options.5 document, which is in `nroff -man' format. Examples: changing the severity level at which a request for service is logged; "allow" and "deny" keywords; running a customized server instead of the standard one; many others. The language extensions are not enabled by default because they introduce an incompatible change to the access control language syntax. Instructions to enable the extensions are given in the Makefile. 4.6 - Multiple ftp/gopher/www archives on one host -------------------------------------------------- Imagine one host with multiple internet addresses. These addresses do not need to have the same internet hostname. Thus, it is possible to offer services with different internet hostnames from just one host. Service providers can use this to offer organizations a presence on the "net" with their own internet hostname, even when those organizations aren't connected to the Internet at all. To the end user it makes no difference, because applications use internet hostnames. There are several ways to assign multiple addresses to one machine. The nice way is to take an existing network interface and to assign additional internet addresses with the `ifconfig' command. Examples: Solaris 2: ifconfig le0:1
netmask up 4.4 BSD: ifconfig en0 alias
netmask On other systems one has to increase the number of network interfaces: either with hardware interfaces, or with pseudo interfaces like SLIP or PPP. The interfaces do not need to be attached to anything. They just need to be up and to be assigned a suitable internet address and mask. With the wrapper software, `daemon@host' access control patterns can be used to distinguish requests by the network address that they are aimed at. Judicious use of the `twist' option (see the hosts_options.5 file, `nroff -man' format) can guide the requests to the right server. These can be servers that live in separate chroot areas, or servers modified to take additional context from the command line, or a combination. Another way is to modify gopher or www listeners so that they bind to only one specific network address. Multiple gopher or www servers can then be run side by side, each taking requests sent to its respective network address. 4.7 - Banner messages --------------------- Some sites are required to present an informational message to users before they attempt to login. Banner messages can also be useful when denying service: instead of simply dropping the connection a polite explanation is given first. Finally, banners can be used to give your system a more personal touch. The wrapper software provides easy-to-use tools to generate pre-login banners for ftp, telnet, rlogin etc. from a single prototype banner textfile. Details on banners and on-the-fly % expansions are given in the hosts_options.5 manual page (`nroff -man' format). An example is given in the file Banners.Makefile. In order to support banner messages the wrappers have to be built with language extensions enabled. See the section on language extensions. 4.8 - Sequence number guessing ------------------------------ Recently, systems came under attack from intruders that exploited a well-known weakness in TCP/IP sequence number generators. This weakness allows intruders to impersonate trusted hosts. Break-ins have been reported via the rsh service. In fact, any network service can be exploited that trusts the client host name or address. A long-term solution is to stop using network services that trust the client host name or address, and to use data encryption instead. A short-term solution, as outlined in in CERT advisory CA-95:01, is to configure network routers so that they discard datagrams from "outside" with an "inside" source address. This approach is most fruitful when you do not trust any hosts outside your local network. The IDENT (RFC931 etc.) client username lookup protocol can help to detect host impersonation attacks. Before accepting a client request, the wrappers can query the client's IDENT server and find out that the client never sent that request. When the client host provides IDENT service, a negative IDENT lookup result (the client matches `UNKNOWN@host') is strong evidence of a host impersonation attack. A positive IDENT lookup result (the client matches `KNOWN@host') is less trustworthy. It is possible for an attacker to spoof both the client request and the IDENT lookup connection, although doing so should be much harder than spoofing just a client request. Another possibility is that the client's IDENT server is lying. Client username lookups are described in more detail in a previous section. Pointers to IDENT daemon software are described in the section on related software. 5 - Other works --------------- 5.1 - Related documents ----------------------- The war story behind the tcp wrapper tools is described in: W.Z. Venema, "TCP WRAPPER, network monitoring, access control and booby traps", UNIX Security Symposium III Proceedings (Baltimore), September 1992. ftp.win.tue.nl:/pub/security/tcp_wrapper.ps.Z (postscript) ftp.win.tue.nl:/pub/security/tcp_wrapper.txt.Z (flat text) The same cracker is also described in: W.R. Cheswick, "An Evening with Berferd, In Which a Cracker is Lured, Endured, and Studied", Proceedings of the Winter USENIX Conference (San Francisco), January 1992. research.att.com:/dist/internet_security/berferd.ps An updated version of the latter paper appeared in: W.R. Cheswick, S.M. Bellovin, "Firewalls and Internet Security", Addison-Wesley, 1994. Discussions on internet firewalls are archived on ftp.greatcircle.com. Subscribe to the mailing list by sending a message to majordomo@greatcircle.com With in the body (not subject): subscribe firewalls. 5.2 - Related software ---------------------- Network daemons etc. with enhanced logging capabilities can generate massive amounts of information: our 150+ workstations generate several hundred kbytes each day. egrep-based filters can help to suppress some of the noise. A more powerful tool is the Swatch monitoring system by Stephen E. Hansen and E. Todd Atkins. Swatch can process log files in real time and can associate arbitrary actions with patterns; its applications are by no means restricted to security. Swatch is available from sierra.stanford.edu, directory /pub/sources. Socks, described in the UNIX Security III proceedings, can be used to control network traffic from hosts on an internal network, through a firewall host, to the outer world. Socks consists of a daemon that is run on the firewall host, and of a library with routines that redirect application socket calls through the firewall daemon. Socks is available from s1.gov in /pub/firewalls/socks.tar.Z. For a modified Socks version by Ying-Da Lee (ylee@syl.dl.nec.com) try ftp.nec.com, directory /pub/security/socks.cstc. Tcpr is a set of perl scripts by Paul Ziemba that enable you to run ftp and telnet commands across a firewall. Unlike socks it can be used with unmodified client software. Available from ftp.alantec.com, /pub/tcpr. The TIS firewall toolkit provides a multitude of tools to build your own internet firewall system. ftp.tis.com, directory /pub/firewalls. Versions of rshd and rlogind, modified to report the client user name in addition to the client host name, are available for anonymous ftp (ftp.win.tue.nl:/pub/security/logdaemon-XX.tar.Z). These programs are drop-in replacements for SunOS 4.x, Ultrix 4.x, SunOS 5.x and HP-UX 9.x. This archive also contains ftpd/rexecd/login versions that support S/Key or SecureNet one-time passwords in addition to traditional UNIX reusable passwords. The securelib shared library by William LeFebvre can be used to control access to network daemons that are not run under control of the inetd or that serve more than one client, such as the NFS mount daemon that runs until the machine goes down. Available from eecs.nwu.edu, file /pub/securelib.tar. xinetd (posted to comp.sources.unix) is an inetd replacement that provides, among others, logging, username lookup and access control. However, it does not support the System V TLI services, and involves much more source code than the daemon wrapper programs. Available from ftp.uu.net, directory /usenet/comp.sources.unix. netlog from Texas A&M relies on the SunOS 4.x /dev/nit interface to passively watch all TCP and UDP network traffic on a network. The current version is on net.tamu.edu in /pub/security/TAMU. Where shared libraries or router-based packet filtering are not an option, an alternative portmap daemon can help to prevent hackers from mounting your NFS file systems using the proxy RPC facility. ftp.win.tue.nl:/pub/security/portmap-X.shar.Z was tested with SunOS 4.1.X Ultrix 3.0 and Ultrix 4.x, HP-UX 8.x and some version of AIX. The protection is less effective than that of the securelib library because portmap is mostly a dictionary service. An rpcbind replacement (the Solaris 2.x moral equivalent of portmap) can be found on ftp.win.tue.nl in /pub/security. It prevents hackers from mounting your NFS file systems by using the proxy RPC facility. Source for a portable RFC 931 (TAP, IDENT, RFC 1413) daemon by Peter Eriksson is available from ftp.lysator.liu.se:/pub/ident/servers. Some TCP/IP implementations come without syslog library. Some come with the library but have no syslog daemon. A replacement can be found in ftp.win.tue.nl:/pub/security/surrogate-syslog.tar.Z. The fakesyslog library that comes with the nntp sources reportedly works well, too. 6 - Limitations --------------- 6.1 - Known wrapper limitations ------------------------------- Many UDP (and rpc/udp) daemons linger around for a while after they have serviced a request, just in case another request comes in. In the inetd configuration file these daemons are registered with the `wait' option. Only the request that started such a daemon will be seen by the wrappers. Such daemons are better protected with the securelib shared library (see: Related software). The wrappers do not work with RPC services over TCP. These services are registered as rpc/tcp in the inetd configuration file. The only non- trivial service that is affected by this limitation is rexd, which is used by the on(1) command. This is no great loss. On most systems, rexd is less secure than a wildcard in /etc/hosts.equiv. Some RPC requests (for example: rwall, rup, rusers) appear to come from the server host. What happens is that the client broadcasts its request to all portmap daemons on its network; each portmap daemon forwards the request to a daemon on its own system. As far as the rwall etc. daemons know, the request comes from the local host. Portmap and RPC (e.g. NIS and NFS) (in)security is a topic in itself. See the section in this document on related software. 6.2 - Known system software bugs -------------------------------- Workarounds have been implemented for several bugs in system software. They are described in the Makefile. Unfortunately, some system software bugs cannot be worked around. The result is loss of functionality. IRIX has so many bugs that it has its own README.IRIX file. Older ConvexOS versions come with a broken recvfrom(2) implementation. This makes it impossible for the daemon wrappers to look up the client host address (and hence, the name) in case of UDP requests. A patch is available for ConvexOS 10.1; later releases should be OK. With early Solaris (SunOS 5) versions, the syslog daemon will leave behind zombie processes when writing to logged-in users. Workaround: increase the syslogd threshold for logging to users, or reduce the wrapper's logging severity. On some systems, the optional RFC 931 etc. client username lookups may trigger a kernel bug. When a client host connects to your system, and the RFC 931 connection from your system to that client is rejected by a router, your kernel may drop all connections with that client. This is not a bug in the wrapper programs: complain to your vendor, and don't enable client user name lookups until the bug has been fixed. Reportedly, SunOS 4.1.1, Next 2.0a, ISC 3.0 with TCP 1.3, and AIX 3.2.2 and later are OK. Sony News/OS 4.51, HP-UX 8-something and Ultrix 4.3 still have the bug. Reportedly, a fix for Ultrix is available (CXO-8919). The following procedure can be used (from outside the tue.nl domain) to find out if your kernel has the bug. From the system under test, do: % ftp 131.155.70.19 This command attempts to make an ftp connection to our anonymous ftp server (ftp.win.tue.nl). When the connection has been established, run the following command from the same system under test, while keeping the ftp connection open: % telnet 131.155.70.19 111 Do not forget the `111' at the end of the command. This telnet command attempts to connect to our portmap process. The telnet command should fail with: "host not reachable", or with a timeout error. If your ftp connection gets messed up, you have the bug. If the telnet command does not fail, please let me know a.s.a.p.! For those who care, the bug is that the BSD kernel code was not careful enough with incoming ICMP UNREACHABLE control messages (it ignored the local and remote port numbers, and therefore zapped *all* connections with the remote system). The bug is still present in the BSD NET/1 source release (1989) but apparently has been fixed in BSD NET/2 (1991). 7 - Configuration and installation ---------------------------------- 7.1 - Easy configuration and installation ----------------------------------------- The "easy" recipe requires no changes to existing software or configuration files. Basically, you move the daemons that you want to protect to a different directory and plug the resulting holes with copies of the wrapper programs. If you don't run Ultrix, you won't need the miscd wrapper program. The miscd daemon implements among others the SYSTAT service, which produces the same output as the WHO command. Type `make' and follow the instructions. The Makefile comes with ready-to-use templates for many common UNIX implementations (sun, ultrix, hp-ux, aix, irix,...). IRIX has so many bugs that it has its own README.IRIX file. When the `make' succeeds the result is five executables (six in case of Ultrix). You can use the `tcpdchk' program to identify the most common problems in your wrapper and inetd configuration files. With the `tcpdmatch' program you can examine how the wrapper would react to specific requests for service. The `safe_finger' command should be used when you implement booby traps: it gives better protection against nasty stuff that remote hosts may do in response to your finger probes. The `try-from' program tests the host and username lookup code. Run it from a remote shell command (`rsh host /some/where/try-from') and it should be able to figure out from what system it is being called. The tcpd program can be used to monitor the telnet, finger, ftp, exec, rsh, rlogin, tftp, talk, comsat and other tcp or udp services that have a one-to-one mapping onto executable files. The tcpd program can also be used for services that are marked as rpc/udp in the inetd configuration file, but not for rpc/tcp services such as rexd. You probably do not want to run rexd anyway. On most systems it is even less secure than a wildcard in /etc/hosts.equiv. With System V.4-style systems, the tcpd program can also handle TLI services. When TCP/IP or UDP/IP is used underneath TLI, tcpd provides the same functions as with socket-based applications. When some other protocol is used underneath TLI, functionality will be limited (no client username lookups, weird network address formats). Decide which services you want to monitor. Move the corresponding vendor-provided daemon programs to the location specified by the REAL_DAEMON_DIR constant in the Makefile, and fill the holes with copies of the tcpd program. That is, one copy of (or link to) the tcpd program for each service that you want to monitor. For example, to monitor the use of your finger service: # mkdir REAL_DAEMON_DIR # mv /usr/etc/in.fingerd REAL_DAEMON_DIR # cp tcpd /usr/etc/in.fingerd The example applies to SunOS 4. With other UNIX implementations the network daemons live in /usr/libexec, /usr/sbin or in /etc, or have no "in." prefix to their names, but you get the idea. File protections: the wrapper, all files used by the wrapper, and all directories in the path leading to those files, should be accessible but not writable for unprivileged users (mode 755 or mode 555). Do not install the wrapper set-uid. Ultrix only: If you want to monitor the SYSTAT service, move the vendor-provided miscd daemon to the location specified by the REAL_DAEMON_DIR macro in the Makefile, and install the miscd wrapper at the original miscd location. In the absence of any access-control tables, the daemon wrappers will just maintain a record of network connections made to your system. 7.2 - Advanced configuration and installation --------------------------------------------- The advanced recipe leaves your daemon executables alone, but involves simple modifications to the inetd configuration file. Type `make' and follow the instructions. The Makefile comes with ready-to-use templates for many common UNIX implementations (sun, ultrix, hp-ux, aix, irix, ...). IRIX users should read the warnings in the README.IRIX file first. When the `make' succeeds the result is five executables (six in case of Ultrix). You can use the `tcpdchk' program to identify the most common problems in your wrapper and inetd configuration files. With the `tcpdmatch' program you can examine how the wrapper would react to specific requests for service. The `try-from' program tests the host and username lookup code. Run it from a remote shell command (`rsh host /some/where/try-from') and it should be able to figure out from what system it is being called. The `safe_finger' command should be used when you implement a booby trap: it gives better protection against nasty stuff that remote hosts may do in response to your finger probes. The tcpd program can be used to monitor the telnet, finger, ftp, exec, rsh, rlogin, tftp, talk, comsat and other tcp or udp services that have a one-to-one mapping onto executable files. With System V.4-style systems, the tcpd program can also handle TLI services. When TCP/IP or UDP/IP is used underneath TLI, tcpd provides the same functions as with socket-based applications. When some other protocol is used underneath TLI, functionality will be limited (no client username lookups, weird network address formats). The tcpd program can also be used for services that are marked as rpc/udp in the inetd configuration file, but not for rpc/tcp services such as rexd. You probably do not want to run rexd anyway. On most systems it is even less secure than a wildcard in /etc/hosts.equiv. Install the tcpd command in a suitable place. Apollo UNIX users will want to install it under a different name because the name "tcpd" is already taken; a suitable name would be "frontd". File protections: the wrapper, all files used by the wrapper, and all directories in the path leading to those files, should be accessible but not writable for unprivileged users (mode 755 or mode 555). Do not install the wrapper set-uid. Then perform the following edits on the inetd configuration file (usually /etc/inetd.conf or /etc/inet/inetd.conf): finger stream tcp nowait nobody /usr/etc/in.fingerd in.fingerd ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ becomes: finger stream tcp nowait nobody /usr/etc/tcpd in.fingerd ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Send a `kill -HUP' to the inetd process to make the change effective. Some IRIX inetd implementations require that you first disable the finger service (comment out the finger service and `kill -HUP' the inetd) before you can turn on the modified version. Sending a HUP twice seems to work just as well for IRIX 5.3, 6.0, 6.0.1 and 6.1. AIX note: you may have to execute the `inetimp' command after changing the inetd configuration file. The example applies to SunOS 4. With other UNIX implementations the network daemons live in /usr/libexec, /usr/sbin, or /etc, the network daemons have no "in." prefix to their names, or the username field in the inetd configuration file may be missing. When the finger service works as expected you can perform similar changes for other network services. Do not forget the `kill -HUP'. The miscd daemon that comes with Ultrix implements several network services. It decides what to do by looking at its process name. One of the services is systat, which is a kind of limited finger service. If you want to monitor the systat service, install the miscd wrapper in a suitable place and update the inetd configuration file: systat stream tcp nowait /suitable/place/miscd systatd Ultrix 4.3 allows you to specify a user id under which the daemon will be executed. This feature is not documented in the manual pages. Thus, the example would become: systat stream tcp nowait nobody /suitable/place/miscd systatd Older Ultrix systems still run all their network daemons as root. In the absence of any access-control tables, the daemon wrappers will just maintain a record of network connections made to your system. 7.3 - Daemons with arbitrary path names --------------------------------------- The above tcpd examples work fine with network daemons that live in a common directory, but sometimes that is not practical. Having soft links all over your file system is not a clean solution, either. Instead you can specify, in the inetd configuration file, an absolute path name for the daemon process name. For example, ntalk dgram udp wait root /usr/etc/tcpd /usr/local/lib/ntalkd When the daemon process name is an absolute path name, tcpd ignores the value of the REAL_DAEMON_DIR constant, and uses the last path component of the daemon process name for logging and for access control. 7.4 - Building and testing the access control rules --------------------------------------------------- In order to support access control the wrappers must be compiled with the -DHOSTS_ACCESS option. The access control policy is given in the form of two tables (default: /etc/hosts.allow and /etc/hosts.deny). Access control is disabled when there are no access control tables, or when the tables are empty. If you haven't used the wrappers before I recommend that you first run them a couple of days without any access control restrictions. The logfile records should give you an idea of the process names and of the host names that you will have to build into your access control rules. The syntax of the access control rules is documented in the file hosts_access.5, which is in `nroff -man' format. This is a lengthy document, and no-one expects you to read it right away from beginning to end. Instead, after reading the introductory section, skip to the examples at the end so that you get a general idea of the language. Then you can appreciate the detailed reference sections near the beginning of the document. The examples in the hosts_access.5 document (`nroff -man' format) show two specific types of access control policy: 1) mostly closed (only permitting access from a limited number of systems) and 2) mostly open (permitting access from everyone except a limited number of trouble makers). You will have to choose what model suits your situation best. Implementing a mixed policy should not be overly difficult either. Optional extensions to the access control language are described in the hosts_options.5 document (`nroff -man' format). The `tcpdchk' program examines all rules in your access control files and reports any problems it can find. `tcpdchk -v' writes to standard output a pretty-printed list of all rules. `tcpdchk -d' examines the hosts.access and hosts.allow files in the current directory. This program is described in the tcpdchk.8 document (`nroff -man' format). The `tcpdmatch' command can be used to try out your local access control files. The command syntax is: tcpdmatch process_name hostname (e.g.: tcpdmatch in.tftpd localhost) tcpdmatch process_name address (e.g.: tcpdmatch in.tftpd 127.0.0.1) This way you can simulate what decisions will be made, and what actions will be taken, when hosts connect to your own system. The program is described in the tcpdmatch.8 document (`nroff -man' format). Note 1: `tcpdmatch -d' will look for hosts.{allow,deny} tables in the current working directory. This is useful for testing new rules without bothering your users. Note 2: you cannot use the `tcpdmatch' command to simulate what happens when the local system connects to other hosts. In order to find out what process name to use, just use the service and watch the process name that shows up in the logfile. Alternatively, you can look up the name from the inetd configuration file. Coming back to the tftp example in the tutorial section above: tftp dgram udp wait root /usr/etc/tcpd in.tftpd -s /tftpboot This entry causes the inetd to run the wrapper program (tcpd) with a process name `in.tftpd'. This is the name that the wrapper will use when scanning the access control tables. Therefore, `in.tftpd' is the process name that should be given to the `tcpdmatch' command. On your system the actual inetd.conf entry may differ (tftpd instead of in.tftpd, and no `root' field), but you get the idea. When you specify a host name, the `tcpdmatch' program will use both the host name and address. This way you can simulate the most common case where the wrappers know both the host address and the host name. The `tcpdmatch' program will iterate over all addresses that it can find for the given host name. When you specify a host address instead of a host name, the `tcpdmatch' program will pretend that the host name is unknown, so that you can simulate what happens when the wrapper is unable to look up the client host name. 7.5 - Other applications ------------------------ The access control routines can easily be integrated with other programs. The hosts_access.3 manual page (`nroff -man' format) describes the external interface of the libwrap.a library. The tcpd program can even be used to control access to the mail service. This can be useful when you suspect that someone is trying out some obscure sendmail bug, or when a remote site is misconfigured and keeps hammering your mail daemon. In that case, sendmail should not be run as a stand-alone network listener, but it should be registered in the inetd configuration file. For example: smtp stream tcp nowait root /usr/etc/tcpd /usr/lib/sendmail -bs You will still need to run one sendmail background process to handle queued-up outgoing mail. A command like: /usr/lib/sendmail -q15m (no `-bd' flag) should take care of that. You cannot really prevent people from posting forged mail this way, because there are many unprotected smtp daemons on the network. 8 - Acknowledgements -------------------- Many people contributed to the evolution of the programs, by asking inspiring questions, by suggesting features or bugfixes, or by submitting source code. Nevertheless, all mistakes and bugs in the wrappers are my own. Thanks to Brendan Kehoe (cs.widener.edu), Heimir Sverrisson (hafro.is) and Dan Bernstein (kramden.acf.nyu.edu) for feedback on an early release of this product. The host name/address check was suggested by John Kimball (src.honeywell.com). Apollo's UNIX environment has some peculiar quirks: Willem-Jan Withagen (eb.ele.tue.nl), Pieter Schoenmakers (es.ele.tue.nl) and Charles S. Fuller (wccs.psc.edu) provided assistance. Hal R. Brand (addvax.llnl.gov) told me how to get the client IP address in case of datagram-oriented services, and suggested the optional shell command feature. Shabbir Safdar (mentor.cc.purdue.edu) provided a first version of a much-needed manual page. Granville Boman Goza, IV (sei.cmu.edu) suggested to use the client IP address even when the host name is available. Casper H.S. Dik (fwi.uva.nl) provided additional insight into DNS spoofing techniques. The bogus daemon feature was inspired by code from Andrew Macpherson (BNR Europe Ltd). Steve Bellovin (research.att.com) confirmed some of my suspicions about the darker sides of TCP/IP insecurity. Risks of automated fingers were pointed out by Borja Marcos (we.lc.ehu.es). Brad Plecs (jhuspo.ca.jhu.edu) was kind enough to try my early TLI code and to work out how DG/UX differs from Solaris. John P. Rouillard (cs.umb.edu) deserves special mention for his persistent, but constructive, nagging about wrong or missing things, and for trying out and discussing embryonic code or ideas. Last but not least, Howard Chu (hanauma.jpl.nasa.gov), Darren Reed (coombs.anu.edu.au), Icarus Sparry (gdr.bath.ac.uk), Scott Schwartz (cs.psu.edu), John A. Kunze (violet.berkeley.edu), Daniel Len Schales (engr.latech.edu), Chris Turbeville (cse.uta.edu), Paul Kranenburg (cs.few.eur.nl), Marc Boucher (cam.org), Dave Mitchell (dcs.shef.ac.uk), Andrew Maffei, Adrian van Bloois, Rop Gonggrijp, John C. Wingenbach, Everett F. Batey and many, many others provided fixes, code fragments, or ideas for improvements. Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl) Department of Mathematics and Computing Science Eindhoven University of Technology P.O. Box 513 5600 MB Eindhoven The Netherlands Currently visiting IBM T.J. Watson Research, Hawthorne NY, USA. 07070100003b65000081a4000000640000006400000001311e185500001a18000000200000001b00000000000000000000002000000009root/opt/WZVwrap/doc/README.NIS@(#) README.NIS 1.2 96/02/11 17:24:52 > Problem: I have several [machines] with multiple IP addresses, and > when they try to connect to a daemon with tcp wrapper, they are often > rejected. I assume this is due to the -DPARANOID option, and depends > on which IP address is returned first from the nameserver for a given > name. This behavior seems to be random, may depend on ordering in > the YP host map? [Note: the situation described below no longer exists. Presently, my internet gateway uses the same IP address on all interfaces. To avoid confusion I have removed the old name wzv-gw.win.tue.nl from the DNS. I have kept the discussion below for educational reasons]. NIS was not designed to handle multi-homed hosts. With NIS, each address should have its own hostname. For example, wzv-gw is my gateway. It has two interfaces: one connected to the local ethernet, the other to a serial link. In the NIS it is registered as: 131.155.210.23 wzv-gw-ether 131.155.12.78 wzv-gw-slip In principle, wzv-gw could be the official name of one of these interfaces, or it could be an alias for both. The DNS was designed to handle multi-homed hosts. In the DNS my gateway is registered in zone win.tue.nl, with one name that has two A records: wzv-gw IN A 131.155.210.23 IN A 131.155.12.78 And of course there are PTR records in zones 210.155.131.in-addr.arpa and 12.155.131.in-addr.arpa that point to wzv-gw.win.tue.nl. This setup does not cause any problems. You can test your name service with the two programs below. This is what they say on a local NIS client (both client and server running SunOS 4.1.3_U1): % gethostbyname wzv-gw Hostname: wzv-gw.win.tue.nl Aliases: Addresses: 131.155.210.23 131.155.12.78 % gethostbyaddr 131.155.210.23 Hostname: wzv-gw-ether Aliases: Addresses: 131.155.210.23 % gethostbyaddr 131.155.12.78 Hostname: wzv-gw-slip Aliases: Addresses: 131.155.12.78 Things seem less confusing when seen by a NIS client in a different domain (both client and server running SunOS 4.1.3_U1): % gethostbyname wzv-gw.win.tue.nl Hostname: wzv-gw.win.tue.nl Aliases: Addresses: 131.155.210.23 131.155.12.78 % gethostbyaddr 131.155.210.23 Hostname: wzv-gw.win.tue.nl Aliases: Addresses: 131.155.12.78 131.155.210.23 % gethostbyaddr 131.155.12.78 Hostname: wzv-gw.win.tue.nl Aliases: Addresses: 131.155.210.23 131.155.12.78 Alas, Solaris 2.4 still has problems. This is what I get on a Solaris 2.4 NIS client, with a SunOS 4.1.3_U1 NIS server: % gethostbyname wzv-gw.win.tue.nl Hostname: wzv-gw.win.tue.nl Aliases: 131.155.210.23 wzv-gw.win.tue.nl Addresses: 131.155.12.78 The tcpd source comes with a workaround for this problem. The workaround is ugly and is not part of the programs attached below. #! /bin/sh # This is a shell archive. Remove anything before this line, then unpack # it by saving it into a file and typing "sh file". To overwrite existing # files, type "sh file -c". You can also feed this as standard input via # unshar, or by typing "sh gethostbyaddr.c <<'END_OF_gethostbyaddr.c' X /* X * gethostbyaddr tester. compile with: X * X * cc -o gethostbyaddr gethostbyaddr.c (SunOS 4.x) X * X * cc -o gethostbyaddr gethostbyaddr.c -lnsl (SunOS 5.x) X * X * run as: gethostbyaddr address X * X * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. X */ X X#include X#include X#include X#include X#include X#include X Xmain(argc, argv) Xint argc; Xchar **argv; X{ X struct hostent *hp; X long addr; X X if (argc != 2) { X fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s i.p.addres\n", argv[0]); X exit(1); X } X addr = inet_addr(argv[1]); X if (hp = gethostbyaddr((char *) &addr, sizeof(addr), AF_INET)) { X printf("Hostname:\t%s\n", hp->h_name); X printf("Aliases:\t"); X while (hp->h_aliases[0]) X printf("%s ", *hp->h_aliases++); X printf("\n"); X printf("Addresses:\t"); X while (hp->h_addr_list[0]) X printf("%s ", inet_ntoa(*(struct in_addr *) * hp->h_addr_list++)); X printf("\n"); X exit(0); X } X fprintf(stderr, "host %s not found\n", argv[1]); X exit(1); X} END_OF_gethostbyaddr.c if test 1073 -ne `wc -c gethostbyname.c <<'END_OF_gethostbyname.c' X /* X * gethostbyname tester. compile with: X * X * cc -o gethostbyname gethostbyname.c (SunOS 4.x) X * X * cc -o gethostbyname gethostbyname.c -lnsl (SunOS 5.x) X * X * run as: gethostbyname hostname X * X * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. X */ X#include X#include X#include X#include X#include X#include X Xmain(argc, argv) Xint argc; Xchar **argv; X{ X struct hostent *hp; X X if (argc != 2) { X fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s hostname\n", argv[0]); X exit(1); X } X if (hp = gethostbyname(argv[1])) { X printf("Hostname:\t%s\n", hp->h_name); X printf("Aliases:\t"); X while (hp->h_aliases[0]) X printf("%s ", *hp->h_aliases++); X printf("\n"); X printf("Addresses:\t"); X while (hp->h_addr_list[0]) X printf("%s ", inet_ntoa(*(struct in_addr *) * hp->h_addr_list++)); X printf("\n"); X exit(0); X } else { X fprintf(stderr, "host %s not found\n", argv[1]); X exit(1); X } X} END_OF_gethostbyname.c if test 999 -ne `wc -c expansion */ extern void rfc931(); /* client name from RFC 931 daemon */ extern void clean_exit(); /* clean up and exit */ extern void refuse(); /* clean up and exit */ extern char *xgets(); /* fgets() on steroids */ extern char *split_at(); /* strchr() and split */ extern unsigned long dot_quad_addr(); /* restricted inet_addr() */ /* Global variables. */ extern int allow_severity; /* for connection logging */ extern int deny_severity; /* for connection logging */ extern char *hosts_allow_table; /* for verification mode redirection */ extern char *hosts_deny_table; /* for verification mode redirection */ extern int hosts_access_verbose; /* for verbose matching mode */ extern int rfc931_timeout; /* user lookup timeout */ extern int resident; /* > 0 if resident process */ /* * Routines for controlled initialization and update of request structure * attributes. Each attribute has its own key. */ #ifdef __STDC__ extern struct request_info *request_init(struct request_info *,...); extern struct request_info *request_set(struct request_info *,...); #else extern struct request_info *request_init(); /* initialize request */ extern struct request_info *request_set(); /* update request structure */ #endif #define RQ_FILE 1 /* file descriptor */ #define RQ_DAEMON 2 /* server process (argv[0]) */ #define RQ_USER 3 /* client user name */ #define RQ_CLIENT_NAME 4 /* client host name */ #define RQ_CLIENT_ADDR 5 /* client host address */ #define RQ_CLIENT_SIN 6 /* client endpoint (internal) */ #define RQ_SERVER_NAME 7 /* server host name */ #define RQ_SERVER_ADDR 8 /* server host address */ #define RQ_SERVER_SIN 9 /* server endpoint (internal) */ /* * Routines for delayed evaluation of request attributes. Each attribute * type has its own access method. The trivial ones are implemented by * macros. The other ones are wrappers around the transport-specific host * name, address, and client user lookup methods. The request_info and * host_info structures serve as caches for the lookup results. */ extern char *eval_user(); /* client user */ extern char *eval_hostname(); /* printable hostname */ extern char *eval_hostaddr(); /* printable host address */ extern char *eval_hostinfo(); /* host name or address */ extern char *eval_client(); /* whatever is available */ extern char *eval_server(); /* whatever is available */ #define eval_daemon(r) ((r)->daemon) /* daemon process name */ #define eval_pid(r) ((r)->pid) /* process id */ /* Socket-specific methods, including DNS hostname lookups. */ extern void sock_host(); /* look up endpoint addresses */ extern void sock_hostname(); /* translate address to hostname */ extern void sock_hostaddr(); /* address to printable address */ #define sock_methods(r) \ { (r)->hostname = sock_hostname; (r)->hostaddr = sock_hostaddr; } /* The System V Transport-Level Interface (TLI) interface. */ #if defined(TLI) || defined(PTX) || defined(TLI_SEQUENT) extern void tli_host(); /* look up endpoint addresses etc. */ #endif /* * Problem reporting interface. Additional file/line context is reported * when available. The jump buffer (tcpd_buf) is not declared here, or * everyone would have to include . */ #ifdef __STDC__ extern void tcpd_warn(char *, ...); /* report problem and proceed */ extern void tcpd_jump(char *, ...); /* report problem and jump */ #else extern void tcpd_warn(); extern void tcpd_jump(); #endif struct tcpd_context { char *file; /* current file */ int line; /* current line */ }; extern struct tcpd_context tcpd_context; /* * While processing access control rules, error conditions are handled by * jumping back into the hosts_access() routine. This is cleaner than * checking the return value of each and every silly little function. The * (-1) returns are here because zero is already taken by longjmp(). */ #define AC_PERMIT 1 /* permit access */ #define AC_DENY (-1) /* deny_access */ #define AC_ERROR AC_DENY /* XXX */ /* * In verification mode an option function should just say what it would do, * instead of really doing it. An option function that would not return * should clear the dry_run flag to inform the caller of this unusual * behavior. */ extern void process_options(); /* execute options */ extern int dry_run; /* verification flag */ /* Bug workarounds. */ #ifdef INET_ADDR_BUG /* inet_addr() returns struct */ #define inet_addr fix_inet_addr extern long fix_inet_addr(); #endif #ifdef BROKEN_FGETS /* partial reads from sockets */ #define fgets fix_fgets extern char *fix_fgets(); #endif #ifdef RECVFROM_BUG /* no address family info */ #define recvfrom fix_recvfrom extern int fix_recvfrom(); #endif #ifdef GETPEERNAME_BUG /* claims success with UDP */ #define getpeername fix_getpeername extern int fix_getpeername(); #endif #ifdef SOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG /* lists addresses as aliases */ #define gethostbyname fix_gethostbyname extern struct hostent *fix_gethostbyname(); #endif #ifdef USE_STRSEP /* libc calls strtok() */ #define strtok fix_strtok extern char *fix_strtok(); #endif #ifdef LIBC_CALLS_STRTOK /* libc calls strtok() */ #define strtok my_strtok extern char *my_strtok(); #endif 0707010001364f000041ed00000064000000640000000233040ec300000000000000200000001b00000000000000000000001500000009root/opt/WZVwrap/lib07070100013650000081a4000000640000006400000001330404ae0000baa4000000200000001b00000000000000000000001f00000009root/opt/WZVwrap/lib/libwrap.a! / 855901358 0 0 0 640 ` )@FFQDQDQDQDQDQDQDQDY]lailqduX|||8888hosts_accesshosts_deny_tablehosts_access_verbosehosts_allow_tableresidentprocess_optionsdry_runshell_cmdrfc931rfc931_timeouteval_servereval_clienteval_usereval_hostnameeval_hostinfoeval_hostaddrparanoidunknownhosts_ctlrefusepercent_xclean_exitsetenvfromhostfix_optionssock_hostsock_hostnamesock_hostaddrtli_hostsccsidfix_gethostbynamerequest_setrequest_initxgetssplit_atdot_quad_addrtcpd_warntcpd_jumptcpd_buftcpd_contextpercent_mhosts_access.o/ 855901306 100 100 100644 5568 ` ELF04( .shstrtab.text.data.rodata.symtab.strtab.rela.text.rela.data.comment㿈'` 4 "`@  `? @ 쀢   @쀠`?㷈 !  '`'@`J$ $`(@ ;@J7 @ .O #*@`J8 !@ :@ @ : @5  @-@ Ð@   @   `@ @`"`"㿐@`", #!@` #ƀ  @ " @` 2    ܔ   @ ܐ 㿐 @ @ @` @` @"b@ 㿐 @ @  @a@a " @@|@ 㿐N @   @  @ @]@` 2@ @!@ K@ F@` @ @ . 5@` /@`)@ @ /"  @@\@@ 2 @`N " @@   㿐N .2@@$  @@`?'@`  @` @`@ @J? .@@`?㿐@? @@?  @ `?@(#) hosts_access.c 1.21 97/02/12 02:13:22, /etc/opt/WZVwrap/hosts.allow/etc/opt/WZVwrap/hosts.denyrmissing newline or line too long missing ":" separatorcannot open %s: %mmatched: %s line %dEXCEPTKNOWNLOCAL01234567890./ALLbad net/mask expression: %s/%slH)+0=L0Ph[gr8d<@&88FT[bipDhosts_access.cclient_matchmydomain.20sccsidstring_matchgcc2_compiled.seplist_matchtable_matchhost_matchmasked_matchserver_matchstrncasecmpxgetstcpd_warnprocess_optionssplit_athosts_accessfclosefopensetjmphosts_deny_tableerrnohosts_access_verbosedot_quad_addreval_userhosts_allow_tableeval_hostnameeval_hostaddrstrtokstrspnstrlenstrchryp_get_default_domainparanoidstrcasecmptcpd_bufunknowninnetgrsyslogresidenttcpd_context, , ( , $( (,( H L d h - - -  @ @ - # H  H( p0"4 pPd xhl xx 8 8       - -   $ (- ,+@H- L- T- p 0t!x 0  0' ! 0' ! 0@ H H$ H4%@L HX*\ Hh l'p  ) ') ') &  ' $)  ')  & $'(& 8L l  " ##'0 4'8 P T'X h) l'p) #'    $ ,8< as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.24N PL( 8' /  : E-options.o/ 855901313 100 100 100644 9992 ` ELF%x4( .shstrtab.text.data.rodata.symtab.strtab.rela.text.rela.data.comment㻐@^ @X @@L``=" N, @N =2 N. @`N " L @   " @ "     @     @     @    @    $@@    `@ €}㿐 @ 㿐 @?`@`@`1!@  @@ 0@'?##@ @ @(@@@@@0 ?cx@  @㿐@ @@  @   @㿐@ . ߒ@ @@  @`  @㿈`@뀢  a  @@㿐 @㿀`@瀢 쀢  @ 쀠@ '@?c @   @㿐 ?@c @  @ 㿈 '`@뀢  @  @쀢  @㿐` I"` @ !@ `@@  @ @@ @ " @@ @@  @ " @@ @@  @ $@ `@  @@㿈 `@뀢 쀢  @"`@㿐@`N  . `@u@r@  @ 㿐 @ 2    2 @㿐@ . '` ߒ ڒ$ Ӓ$$%㿐  N # L " : \ L @`2 L  :"  ,@ L `" ,@ (8 2 `" J `* @(#) options.c 1.17 96/02/11 17:01:31=  08@xbannersdenyallowseveritynicesetenvrfc931twistspawnkeepalivelingerumaskgroupusermissing option namebad option name: "%s"option "%s" requires valueoption "%s" requires no valueoption "%s" must be at endoption: %s %s%s/%sr %s: %munknown group: "%s"setgid(%s): %munknown user: "%s"setuid(%s): %m%o%cbad umask value: "%s"%d%cbad linger value: "%s"setsockopt SO_LINGER %d: %msetsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %mbad nice value: "%s"nice(%d): %mtwist option in resident processtwist %s to %stwist_option: dup: %m/bin/shsh-ctwist_option: /bin/sh: %mbad rfc931 timeout: "%s"memory allocation failurelocal7local6local5local4local3local2local1local0cronuucpnewslprauthdaemonmailkerndebuginfonoticewarningerrcritalertemergbad syslog facility or severity: "%s"rule ends in ":"  P( |28?XLR8p`8m(z&lh0p4DT <t'H/P<BHR\enz8#2<GNU\cr}(options.cuser_optionkeepalive_optionget_fieldallow_optionumask_optionon.28setenv_optionoption_tablespawn_optionsccsidrfc931_optiongroup_optionwhitespace_eqlinger_optionbanners_optiontwist_optiongcc2_compiled.last.43deny_optionchop_stringnice_optionseverity_optionlog_faclog_sevseverity_mapfgetcfgetstcpd_warntcpd_jumpendpwentendgrenteval_clientstatprocess_optionspercent_xsplit_atcloseshell_cmdumaskdeny_severityfclosefopensetuidsetgidsetenvwritesetsockopt__ctypehosts_access_verboseexeclungetcrfc931_timeouteval_userclean_exitsscanfstrlenstrspnstrcatallow_severitystrcasecmptcpd_bufsysloglongjmpnicegetpwnamgetgrnamresidentsprintfdupdry_runstrcspn 0 04Kd= 1= 1 !  8 8 8@   !@ D H!l p t!  !5 '5 5        B<A @A DCXA \A `C ( (H 0. 0    27 8 ( >$ 84'@<P2`-|% @ @ F H H!#J J 0 ` `!(0E@ pD pH!P"XJ \J l/|  !  ;   !+J J *   (;8 HJ L P T!\J `J 3   J J   3     $ ,;< @ D!LJ PJ `Dp 0t 0x J J G J G  @! @, $,  h hB)I  x )(I8 xL)TId xl x| )      6   :  ; 8    !8 $8 (9@ 1DKH 11 ! @  ! ( ? ? , , $ ( 8  <  P, T  X                 (  ,  P4  T4 8x< DpHPhT\``hPltHx@808(8Tpxxph` X(P0H8@@8H0P(X `hp as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.24N   8  '/  :" E%H-shell_cmd.o/ 855901317 100 100 100644 1704 ` ELF@4( .shstrtab.text.data.rodata.symtab.strtab.rela.text.comment㿐@? 0@ 0 @ @ ?㿐 @  @   @   @ @ "   `@  @@ @(#) shell_cmd.c 1.5 94/12/28 17:42:44cannot fork: %m/dev/nullopen /dev/null: %mdup: %m/bin/shsh-cexecl /bin/sh: %m d',6<dFMSX\agshell_cmd.cdo_childsccsidgcc2_compiled.tcpd_warncloseshell_cmdsignalexeclwaitdupfork_exitopen( ,0 @ l x      8 @ 8 8 @ H H P P  X X as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.24C x$'j4 'Tl/P :-rfc931.o/ 855901322 100 100 100644 2592 ` ELF4( .shstrtab.text.data.rodata.bss.symtab.strtab.rela.text.comment㿐@@   @`@ @㿐 @@''' '  ה k'@ @ ` @`@ @'`'`'` '7@'`'`'` ' q7@@  ;@@  3``@`@А"@ "`  @А`̖@ `̀@`Ȁ@ @ 2*'@ @@ +`@(#) rfc931.c 1.10 95/01/02 16:11:34 socket: %mr+fdopen: %m%u,%u %u , %u : USERID :%*[^:]:%255s % 0(d0d8>HNT[bipw~(rfc931.csccsidgcc2_compiled.timebuftimeoutfsocketfgetstcpd_warnclosealarmfclosefdopensetbufsetjmprfc931fflushsignalfilenorfc931_timeoutsocketsscanfstrchrunknownlongjmpconnectbindfprintfstrncpy   $ ( 4 8< H L P T h l p    d d  HTht ( (  0 00LTd as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.24H ||,(Ox0$x ,4h ?`-eval.o/ 855901324 100 100 100644 2160 ` ELF4( .shstrtab.text.data.rodata.bss.symtab.strtab.rela.text.comment㿐N   @`#(  " #`@ 㿐N   @`!#0`@ 㿐N  @`!#,`@㿐@@` @` @㿐@!L  "@@` 1  ` @ 㿐@" @` 1  `@ @(#) eval.c 1.3 95/01/30 19:51:45unknownparanoid%s@%s"&.X:@pFMdWDeTsdD0 (eval.csccsidgcc2_compiled.both.10both.13eval_servereval_clientrfc931eval_usereval_hostnameeval_hostinfoeval_hostaddrstrcpyparanoidstrcasecmpunknownsprintf   T x |       ,Hd l pt             as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.24H |9$` ,04 ?-hosts_ctl.o/ 855901326 100 100 100644 832 ` ELF4(.shstrtab.text.data.symtab.strtab.rela.text.comment@#\ #`#d#h  @ @@(#) hosts_ctl.c 1.4 94/12/28 17:42:27 '#0D:hosts_ctl.csccsidgcc2_compiled.hosts_accesshosts_ctlrequest_init,4as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.24; pD'pG' 2-refuse.o/ 855901328 100 100 100644 1008 ` ELF4( .shstrtab.text.data.rodata.symtab.strtab.rela.text.comment㿐!@ @`@@(#) refuse.c 1.5 94/12/28 17:42:39refused connect from %s $ ,:4ALrefuse.csccsidgcc2_compiled.eval_clientdeny_severityrefuseclean_exitsyslog      $ as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.24C x4$'S/T :X-percent_x.o/ 855901330 100 100 100644 1968 ` ELFH4( .shstrtab.text.data.rodata.symtab.strtab.rela.text.comment㿐 q) _`%VN`R`a`A`c@;`d@5`h1`H`n@&`N`p@`s`u@`%@ @   @ @N@ "&@.@ @*  @@ @ @@N ,@@(#) percent_x.c 1.4 94/12/28 17:42:371234567890!@%-_=+:,./abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZunrecognized %%%c%percent_x: expansion too long: %.30s... '#(J.8DPZ`elvpercent_x.csccsidgcc2_compiled.ok_chars.2tcpd_warneval_servereval_clientpercent_xsleepexitmemcpyeval_usereval_hostnameeval_hostinfoeval_hostaddrstrspn  (d|  $8 <@ D L P T `d ( ( (  as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.24C x`rP(@'h/ :-clean_exit.o/ 855901331 100 100 100644 804 ` ELF4(.shstrtab.text.data.symtab.strtab.rela.text.comment㿐#(`@@ @ @(#) clean_exit.c 1.4 94/12/28 17:42:19($*/4clean_exit.csccsidgcc2_compiled.sleepexitclean_exit$as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.24; p4(`:' 2-setenv.o/ 855901332 100 100 100644 1092 ` ELF4( .shstrtab.text.data.rodata.symtab.strtab.rela.text.comment㿐 @  @@@  `@@ @(#) setenv.c 1.1 93/03/07 22:47:58%s=%s $ '.5<Csetenv.csccsidgcc2_compiled.mallocgetenvsetenvstrlenputenvsprintf, 8 DT X ` h as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.24C x$(0'K/L` :-fromhost.o/ 855901335 100 100 100644 952 ` ELFP4( .shstrtab.text.data.rodata.symtab.strtab.rela.text.comment㿐c @ @0@@(#) fromhost.c 1.17 94/12/28 17:42:23timod '"+D4:fromhost.csccsidgcc2_compiled.tli_hostfromhostioctlsock_host   (4 as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.24C xD''D/< : -fix_options.o/ 855901338 100 100 100644 1872 ` ELF4( .shstrtab.text.data.rodata.symtab.strtab.rela.text.commentؐ '<@@   @ @< m< jD@@<@ @   D?~ ?x 8 `@ * @@< @#@)@ @   @ @ @  2 `   @@<@* @@< @%@ @`<?'<  @ `@@  @<  @`@@(#) fix_options.c 1.4 97/02/12 02:13:22iprefused connect from %s with IP source routing options %2.2xconnect from %s with IP options (ignored):%ssetsockopt IP_OPTIONS NULL: %m)%1<GVa mtfix_options.csccsidgcc2_compiled.eval_clientsetsockoptgetsockoptgetprotobynameclean_exitfix_optionssyslogsprintf   D     | @ @ H H  x  x as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.24C x )P'@|/ :-socket.o/ 855901341 100 100 100644 2684 ` ELF4( .shstrtab.text.data.rodata.bss.symtab.strtab.rela.text.comment㻈 &#, � ''@  &#('$ @ @ 0 &" '`@쀢 @ 0 &#㿈!    '@@ . 㿈!J F @ @@@ . @ @.@@  @`  `  , @@   `, @ 2, '@ @@@`x 'ܐ$ @܁@(#) socket.c 1.14 95/01/30 19:51:50can't get client address: %mgetsockname: %mcan't verify hostname: gethostbyname(%s) failedlocalhosthost name/name mismatch: %s != %shost name/address mismatch: %s != %s %%`0/>HV]gq$<@socket.cserver.11sccsidclient.10sock_sinkgcc2_compiled.tcpd_warngethostbyaddrmemcmpinet_ntoasock_hostfix_gethostbynamesock_hostnamesock_hostaddrgetsocknamegetpeernamestrcpyparanoidstrcasecmprecvfromstrncpy    0 4 8H L `P `l p          L dp 0 0  ` ` p p ,8 < @ L PT as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.24H |%8 $ ,4|@ ?-tli.o/ 855901345 100 100 100644 5296 ` ELF 4( .shstrtab.text.data.rodata.bss.symtab.strtab.rela.text.comment㿐@U@ 0 @` *"   @"`"`"` " &"#   @"`"`"` " &#@ &#,  � &#, � 㿐#8 ""@" "# @ # @ 㿈 @ *`@   2&" &#(@쀢   2 &"@@  @  @@ 0`@ 6&# @ @ 㾀@h  @2 @@ ) @ @  @ @ @  @ @ @ 㿐!#8 !` @ @ . @㿈!#8L!I@쀢 D  @耢  @*@ @,`@*`@@  @`?@`@   @ @ . @ 㿐 `` @ 1 `   ` @ 1 `@ 0  *`@㿈 @  @ @ 0@@ @(#) tli.c 1.14 95/01/03 22:26:03inett_alloc: %scan't get client address: %sTI_GETMYNAME: %mfstat(fd %d): %msetnetconfig: %munable to identify transport protocolgetnetconfigent(%s): %scan't verify hostname: netdir_getbyname(%s) failedhost name/address mismatch: %s != %sUnknown TLI error %dUnknown UNIX error %dd8H'lX4";(E OX]tkz(T.6>FN\jvtli.ctli_sinkserver.11tli_hostnametli_hostaddrsccsidclient.10tli_errortli_endpointstli_transportgcc2_compiled.buf.24tli_cleanuptli_hostnetdir_getbynamenetdir_getbyaddrfreetcpd_warnstatt_freet_nerrsys_errlistsleept_rcvudataioctlerrnonc_sperrorsys_nerrfstatfreenetconfigentt_alloct_errno__major__minorsock_hostnamesock_hostaddrtaddr2uaddreval_hostaddrstrcmpnetdir_freeparanoidstrcasecmpgetnetconfigentsprintfgetnetconfigsetnetconfigstrncpyt_errlist$ (., 8 H L X    ' ' ( (    l l  "0Hh#     #( ,0 @T 8X\ 8d|! P P2 h h1&%  $ 0/DP T X)3   $4*p)+,  - - 3,$ $ ( , 8$ <$ @ D H  L  T$ X$ \4 d4 h l x |      8 8 0    #   as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.24H |0"N(H$(P, x4 h ?-workarounds.o/ 855901348 100 100 100644 1036 ` ELF4(.shstrtab.text.data.symtab.strtab.rela.text.comment㿈 @.   ) ` $ @ @?'@ @`     @ @`$@ &  & @(#) workarounds.c 1.6 96/03/19 16:22:25,)3:Dworkarounds.cgcc2_compiled.gethostbynamesccsidmemcpyinet_addrfix_gethostbynameTtas: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.24; pH)tV'l0 2-update.o/ 855901350 100 100 100644 1804 ` ELF|4( .shstrtab.text.data.rodata.bss.symtab.strtab.rela.text.commenth #``2 * @`0`&`&"`&#    !!""`@ , 㿐'H'L'P'T'XH`@#<?& @`@!@`&"&#$㿐'H'L'P'T'XH@(#) update.c 1.1 94/12/28 17:42:56request_fill: invalid key: %d%d $ </<FMT[l,gowupdate.csccsidgcc2_compiled.default_info.4request_filltcpd_warngetpidmemcpystrcpyrequest_setunknownsprintfstrncpyrequest_init < <  <l@DHLP|TX\` d    ( , 0 4 D HL as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.24H |$@#d<$d0 ,4 , ?L-misc.o/ 855901352 100 100 100644 1252 ` ELF4(.shstrtab.text.data.symtab.strtab.rela.text.comment㿐 @ @@J 2 ` `$`J \2  &@ .` 㿐@ * 㿐  N J@ . 2` `J@  .?@@(#) misc.c 1.2 96/02/11 17:01:29"$*,3=KRYmisc.csccsicgcc2_compiled.fgetsxgetssplit_atinet_addrdot_quad_addrstrlenstrchrtcpd_context ,  < as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.24; pP"f',H 2t-diag.o/ 855901354 100 100 100644 1400 ` ELF4( .shstrtab.text.data.rodata.symtab.strtab.rela.text.comment㻐   `@ `@ @㿐'H'L'P'T'X `ܖH㿐'H'L'P'T'X `ΖH @?@(#) diag.c 1.1 94/12/28 17:42:20%s: %s, line %d: %s%s: %swarningerrorh"(h82H<0EMUbdiag.ctcpd_diagsccsidgcc2_compiled.tcpd_warntcpd_jumptcpd_buflongjmpsprintftcpd_contextvsyslog   $ ( , @ D H X   ( ( as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.24C x`".'j/ :-percent_m.o/ 855901356 100 100 100644 1256 ` ELF4( .shstrtab.text.data.rodata.symtab.strtab.rela.text.comment㿐@ ).#' N@ %2 N` m2 `@6 `*`@@0`@`@``@ ,@(#) percent_m.c 1.1 94/12/28 17:42:37Unknown error %d '#-9?HOVpercent_m.csccsidgcc2_compiled.percent_msys_errlisterrnosys_nerrstrlenstrcpysprintf   $ H L X l x   as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.24C x8'`t'T^/ :P-myvsyslog.o/ 855901357 100 100 100644 600 ` ELF@4(.shstrtab.text.data.symtab.strtab.comment@(#) myvsyslog.c 1.1 94/12/28 17:42:33 'myvsyslog.csccsidgcc2_compiled.as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.240 dh'`#'-07070100004a19000041ed00000064000000640000000533040ec300000000000000200000001b00000000000000000000001500000009root/opt/WZVwrap/man070701000058cd000041ed00000064000000640000000233040ec300000000000000200000001b00000000000000000000001a00000009root/opt/WZVwrap/man/man3070701000058ce000081a4000000640000006400000001311e12d700000e12000000200000001b00000000000000000000002900000009root/opt/WZVwrap/man/man3/hosts_access.3.TH HOSTS_ACCESS 3 .SH NAME hosts_access, hosts_ctl, request_init, request_set \- access control library .SH SYNOPSIS .nf #include "tcpd.h" extern int allow_severity; extern int deny_severity; struct request_info *request_init(request, key, value, ..., 0) struct request_info *request; struct request_info *request_set(request, key, value, ..., 0) struct request_info *request; int hosts_access(request) struct request_info *request; int hosts_ctl(daemon, client_name, client_addr, client_user) char *daemon; char *client_name; char *client_addr; char *client_user; .fi .SH DESCRIPTION The routines described in this document are part of the \fIlibwrap.a\fR library. They implement a rule-based access control language with optional shell commands that are executed when a rule fires. .PP request_init() initializes a structure with information about a client request. request_set() updates an already initialized request structure. Both functions take a variable-length list of key-value pairs and return their first argument. The argument lists are terminated with a zero key value. All string-valued arguments are copied. The expected keys (and corresponding value types) are: .IP "RQ_FILE (int)" The file descriptor associated with the request. .IP "RQ_CLIENT_NAME (char *)" The client host name. .IP "RQ_CLIENT_ADDR (char *)" A printable representation of the client network address. .IP "RQ_CLIENT_SIN (struct sockaddr_in *)" An internal representation of the client network address and port. The contents of the structure are not copied. .IP "RQ_SERVER_NAME (char *)" The hostname associated with the server endpoint address. .IP "RQ_SERVER_ADDR (char *)" A printable representation of the server endpoint address. .IP "RQ_SERVER_SIN (struct sockaddr_in *)" An internal representation of the server endpoint address and port. The contents of the structure are not copied. .IP "RQ_DAEMON (char *)" The name of the daemon process running on the server host. .IP "RQ_USER (char *)" The name of the user on whose behalf the client host makes the request. .PP hosts_access() consults the access control tables described in the \fIhosts_access(5)\fR manual page. When internal endpoint information is available, host names and client user names are looked up on demand, using the request structure as a cache. hosts_access() returns zero if access should be denied. .PP hosts_ctl() is a wrapper around the request_init() and hosts_access() routines with a perhaps more convenient interface (though it does not pass on enough information to support automated client username lookups). The client host address, client host name and username arguments should contain valid data or STRING_UNKNOWN. hosts_ctl() returns zero if access should be denied. .PP The \fIallow_severity\fR and \fIdeny_severity\fR variables determine how accepted and rejected requests may be logged. They must be provided by the caller and may be modified by rules in the access control tables. .SH DIAGNOSTICS Problems are reported via the syslog daemon. .SH SEE ALSO hosts_access(5), format of the access control tables. hosts_options(5), optional extensions to the base language. .SH FILES /etc/hosts.allow, /etc/hosts.deny, access control tables. .SH BUGS hosts_access() uses the strtok() library function. This may interfere with other code that relies on strtok(). .SH AUTHOR .na .nf Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl) Department of Mathematics and Computing Science Eindhoven University of Technology Den Dolech 2, P.O. Box 513, 5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands \" @(#) hosts_access.3 1.8 96/02/11 17:01:26 0707010000766c000041ed00000064000000640000000233040ec300000000000000200000001b00000000000000000000001a00000009root/opt/WZVwrap/man/man50707010000766d000081a40000006400000064000000012f2d354300003b79000000200000001b00000000000000000000002900000009root/opt/WZVwrap/man/man5/hosts_access.5.TH HOSTS_ACCESS 5 .SH NAME hosts_access \- format of host access control files .SH DESCRIPTION This manual page describes a simple access control language that is based on client (host name/address, user name), and server (process name, host name/address) patterns. Examples are given at the end. The impatient reader is encouraged to skip to the EXAMPLES section for a quick introduction. .PP An extended version of the access control language is described in the \fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. The extensions are turned on at program build time by building with -DPROCESS_OPTIONS. .PP In the following text, \fIdaemon\fR is the the process name of a network daemon process, and \fIclient\fR is the name and/or address of a host requesting service. Network daemon process names are specified in the inetd configuration file. .SH ACCESS CONTROL FILES The access control software consults two files. The search stops at the first match: .IP \(bu Access will be granted when a (daemon,client) pair matches an entry in the \fI/etc/hosts.allow\fR file. .IP \(bu Otherwise, access will be denied when a (daemon,client) pair matches an entry in the \fI/etc/hosts.deny\fR file. .IP \(bu Otherwise, access will be granted. .PP A non-existing access control file is treated as if it were an empty file. Thus, access control can be turned off by providing no access control files. .SH ACCESS CONTROL RULES Each access control file consists of zero or more lines of text. These lines are processed in order of appearance. The search terminates when a match is found. .IP \(bu A newline character is ignored when it is preceded by a backslash character. This permits you to break up long lines so that they are easier to edit. .IP \(bu Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#\' character are ignored. This permits you to insert comments and whitespace so that the tables are easier to read. .IP \(bu All other lines should satisfy the following format, things between [] being optional: .sp .ti +3 daemon_list : client_list [ : shell_command ] .PP \fIdaemon_list\fR is a list of one or more daemon process names (argv[0] values) or wildcards (see below). .PP \fIclient_list\fR is a list of one or more host names, host addresses, patterns or wildcards (see below) that will be matched against the client host name or address. .PP The more complex forms \fIdaemon@host\fR and \fIuser@host\fR are explained in the sections on server endpoint patterns and on client username lookups, respectively. .PP List elements should be separated by blanks and/or commas. .PP With the exception of NIS (YP) netgroup lookups, all access control checks are case insensitive. .ne 4 .SH PATTERNS The access control language implements the following patterns: .IP \(bu A string that begins with a `.\' character. A host name is matched if the last components of its name match the specified pattern. For example, the pattern `.tue.nl\' matches the host name `wzv.win.tue.nl\'. .IP \(bu A string that ends with a `.\' character. A host address is matched if its first numeric fields match the given string. For example, the pattern `131.155.\' matches the address of (almost) every host on the Eind\%hoven University network (131.155.x.x). .IP \(bu A string that begins with an `@\' character is treated as an NIS (formerly YP) netgroup name. A host name is matched if it is a host member of the specified netgroup. Netgroup matches are not supported for daemon process names or for client user names. .IP \(bu An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m\' is interpreted as a `net/mask\' pair. A host address is matched if `net\' is equal to the bitwise AND of the address and the `mask\'. For example, the net/mask pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0\' matches every address in the range `131.155.72.0\' through `131.155.73.255\'. .SH WILDCARDS The access control language supports explicit wildcards: .IP ALL The universal wildcard, always matches. .IP LOCAL Matches any host whose name does not contain a dot character. .IP UNKNOWN Matches any user whose name is unknown, and matches any host whose name \fIor\fR address are unknown. This pattern should be used with care: host names may be unavailable due to temporary name server problems. A network address will be unavailable when the software cannot figure out what type of network it is talking to. .IP KNOWN Matches any user whose name is known, and matches any host whose name \fIand\fR address are known. This pattern should be used with care: host names may be unavailable due to temporary name server problems. A network address will be unavailable when the software cannot figure out what type of network it is talking to. .IP PARANOID Matches any host whose name does not match its address. When tcpd is built with -DPARANOID (default mode), it drops requests from such clients even before looking at the access control tables. Build without -DPARANOID when you want more control over such requests. .ne 6 .SH OPERATORS .IP EXCEPT Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2\'; this construct matches anything that matches \fIlist_1\fR unless it matches \fIlist_2\fR. The EXCEPT operator can be used in daemon_lists and in client_lists. The EXCEPT operator can be nested: if the control language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c\' would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))\'. .br .ne 6 .SH SHELL COMMANDS If the first-matched access control rule contains a shell command, that command is subjected to % substitutions (see next section). The result is executed by a \fI/bin/sh\fR child process with standard input, output and error connected to \fI/dev/null\fR. Specify an `&\' at the end of the command if you do not want to wait until it has completed. .PP Shell commands should not rely on the PATH setting of the inetd. Instead, they should use absolute path names, or they should begin with an explicit PATH=whatever statement. .PP The \fIhosts_options\fR(5) document describes an alternative language that uses the shell command field in a different and incompatible way. .SH % EXPANSIONS The following expansions are available within shell commands: .IP "%a (%A)" The client (server) host address. .IP %c Client information: user@host, user@address, a host name, or just an address, depending on how much information is available. .IP %d The daemon process name (argv[0] value). .IP "%h (%H)" The client (server) host name or address, if the host name is unavailable. .IP "%n (%N)" The client (server) host name (or "unknown" or "paranoid"). .IP %p The daemon process id. .IP %s Server information: daemon@host, daemon@address, or just a daemon name, depending on how much information is available. .IP %u The client user name (or "unknown"). .IP %% Expands to a single `%\' character. .PP Characters in % expansions that may confuse the shell are replaced by underscores. .SH SERVER ENDPOINT PATTERNS In order to distinguish clients by the network address that they connect to, use patterns of the form: .sp .ti +3 process_name@host_pattern : client_list ... .sp Patterns like these can be used when the machine has different internet addresses with different internet hostnames. Service providers can use this facility to offer FTP, GOPHER or WWW archives with internet names that may even belong to different organizations. See also the `twist' option in the hosts_options(5) document. Some systems (Solaris, FreeBSD) can have more than one internet address on one physical interface; with other systems you may have to resort to SLIP or PPP pseudo interfaces that live in a dedicated network address space. .sp The host_pattern obeys the same syntax rules as host names and addresses in client_list context. Usually, server endpoint information is available only with connection-oriented services. .SH CLIENT USERNAME LOOKUP When the client host supports the RFC 931 protocol or one of its descendants (TAP, IDENT, RFC 1413) the wrapper programs can retrieve additional information about the owner of a connection. Client username information, when available, is logged together with the client host name, and can be used to match patterns like: .PP .ti +3 daemon_list : ... user_pattern@host_pattern ... .PP The daemon wrappers can be configured at compile time to perform rule-driven username lookups (default) or to always interrogate the client host. In the case of rule-driven username lookups, the above rule would cause username lookup only when both the \fIdaemon_list\fR and the \fIhost_pattern\fR match. .PP A user pattern has the same syntax as a daemon process pattern, so the same wildcards apply (netgroup membership is not supported). One should not get carried away with username lookups, though. .IP \(bu The client username information cannot be trusted when it is needed most, i.e. when the client system has been compromised. In general, ALL and (UN)KNOWN are the only user name patterns that make sense. .IP \(bu Username lookups are possible only with TCP-based services, and only when the client host runs a suitable daemon; in all other cases the result is "unknown". .IP \(bu A well-known UNIX kernel bug may cause loss of service when username lookups are blocked by a firewall. The wrapper README document describes a procedure to find out if your kernel has this bug. .IP \(bu Username lookups may cause noticeable delays for non-UNIX users. The default timeout for username lookups is 10 seconds: too short to cope with slow networks, but long enough to irritate PC users. .PP Selective username lookups can alleviate the last problem. For example, a rule like: .PP .ti +3 daemon_list : @pcnetgroup ALL@ALL .PP would match members of the pc netgroup without doing username lookups, but would perform username lookups with all other systems. .SH DETECTING ADDRESS SPOOFING ATTACKS A flaw in the sequence number generator of many TCP/IP implementations allows intruders to easily impersonate trusted hosts and to break in via, for example, the remote shell service. The IDENT (RFC931 etc.) service can be used to detect such and other host address spoofing attacks. .PP Before accepting a client request, the wrappers can use the IDENT service to find out that the client did not send the request at all. When the client host provides IDENT service, a negative IDENT lookup result (the client matches `UNKNOWN@host') is strong evidence of a host spoofing attack. .PP A positive IDENT lookup result (the client matches `KNOWN@host') is less trustworthy. It is possible for an intruder to spoof both the client connection and the IDENT lookup, although doing so is much harder than spoofing just a client connection. It may also be that the client\'s IDENT server is lying. .PP Note: IDENT lookups don\'t work with UDP services. .SH EXAMPLES The language is flexible enough that different types of access control policy can be expressed with a minimum of fuss. Although the language uses two access control tables, the most common policies can be implemented with one of the tables being trivial or even empty. .PP When reading the examples below it is important to realize that the allow table is scanned before the deny table, that the search terminates when a match is found, and that access is granted when no match is found at all. .PP The examples use host and domain names. They can be improved by including address and/or network/netmask information, to reduce the impact of temporary name server lookup failures. .SH MOSTLY CLOSED In this case, access is denied by default. Only explicitly authorized hosts are permitted access. .PP The default policy (no access) is implemented with a trivial deny file: .PP .ne 2 /etc/hosts.deny: .in +3 ALL: ALL .PP This denies all service to all hosts, unless they are permitted access by entries in the allow file. .PP The explicitly authorized hosts are listed in the allow file. For example: .PP .ne 2 /etc/hosts.allow: .in +3 ALL: LOCAL @some_netgroup .br ALL: .foobar.edu EXCEPT terminalserver.foobar.edu .PP The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.\' in the host name) and from members of the \fIsome_netgroup\fP netgroup. The second rule permits access from all hosts in the \fIfoobar.edu\fP domain (notice the leading dot), with the exception of \fIterminalserver.foobar.edu\fP. .SH MOSTLY OPEN Here, access is granted by default; only explicitly specified hosts are refused service. .PP The default policy (access granted) makes the allow file redundant so that it can be omitted. The explicitly non-authorized hosts are listed in the deny file. For example: .PP /etc/hosts.deny: .in +3 ALL: some.host.name, .some.domain .br ALL EXCEPT in.fingerd: other.host.name, .other.domain .PP The first rule denies some hosts and domains all services; the second rule still permits finger requests from other hosts and domains. .SH BOOBY TRAPS The next example permits tftp requests from hosts in the local domain (notice the leading dot). Requests from any other hosts are denied. Instead of the requested file, a finger probe is sent to the offending host. The result is mailed to the superuser. .PP .ne 2 /etc/hosts.allow: .in +3 .nf in.tftpd: LOCAL, .my.domain .PP .ne 2 /etc/hosts.deny: .in +3 .nf in.tftpd: ALL: (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | \\ /usr/ucb/mail -s %d-%h root) & .fi .PP The safe_finger command comes with the tcpd wrapper and should be installed in a suitable place. It limits possible damage from data sent by the remote finger server. It gives better protection than the standard finger command. .PP The expansion of the %h (client host) and %d (service name) sequences is described in the section on shell commands. .PP Warning: do not booby-trap your finger daemon, unless you are prepared for infinite finger loops. .PP On network firewall systems this trick can be carried even further. The typical network firewall only provides a limited set of services to the outer world. All other services can be "bugged" just like the above tftp example. The result is an excellent early-warning system. .br .ne 4 .SH DIAGNOSTICS An error is reported when a syntax error is found in a host access control rule; when the length of an access control rule exceeds the capacity of an internal buffer; when an access control rule is not terminated by a newline character; when the result of % expansion would overflow an internal buffer; when a system call fails that shouldn\'t. All problems are reported via the syslog daemon. .SH FILES .na .nf /etc/hosts.allow, (daemon,client) pairs that are granted access. /etc/hosts.deny, (daemon,client) pairs that are denied access. .ad .fi .SH SEE ALSO .nf tcpd(8) tcp/ip daemon wrapper program. tcpdchk(8), tcpdmatch(8), test programs. .SH BUGS If a name server lookup times out, the host name will not be available to the access control software, even though the host is registered. .PP Domain name server lookups are case insensitive; NIS (formerly YP) netgroup lookups are case sensitive. .SH AUTHOR .na .nf Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl) Department of Mathematics and Computing Science Eindhoven University of Technology Den Dolech 2, P.O. Box 513, 5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands \" @(#) hosts_access.5 1.20 95/01/30 19:51:46 0707010000766e000081a40000006400000064000000012f019575000019ff000000200000001b00000000000000000000002a00000009root/opt/WZVwrap/man/man5/hosts_options.5.TH HOSTS_OPTIONS 5 .SH NAME hosts_options \- host access control language extensions .SH DESCRIPTION This document describes optional extensions to the language described in the hosts_access(5) document. The extensions are enabled at program build time. For example, by editing the Makefile and turning on the PROCESS_OPTIONS compile-time option. .PP The extensible language uses the following format: .sp .ti +3 daemon_list : client_list : option : option ... .PP The first two fields are described in the hosts_access(5) manual page. The remainder of the rules is a list of zero or more options. Any ":" characters within options should be protected with a backslash. .PP An option is of the form "keyword" or "keyword value". Options are processed in the specified order. Some options are subjected to % substitutions. For the sake of backwards compatibility with earlier versions, an "=" is permitted between keyword and value. .SH LOGGING .IP "severity mail.info" .IP "severity notice" Change the severity level at which the event will be logged. Facility names (such as mail) are optional, and are not supported on systems with older syslog implementations. The severity option can be used to emphasize or to ignore specific events. .SH ACCESS CONTROL .IP "allow" .IP "deny" Grant (deny) service. These options must appear at the end of a rule. .PP The \fIallow\fR and \fIdeny\fR keywords make it possible to keep all access control rules within a single file, for example in the \fIhosts.allow\fR file. .sp To permit access from specific hosts only: .sp .ne 2 .ti +3 ALL: .friendly.domain: ALLOW .ti +3 ALL: ALL: DENY .sp To permit access from all hosts except a few trouble makers: .sp .ne 2 .ti +3 ALL: .bad.domain: DENY .ti +3 ALL: ALL: ALLOW .sp Notice the leading dot on the domain name patterns. .SH RUNNING OTHER COMMANDS .IP "spawn shell_command" Execute, in a child process, the specified shell command, after performing the % expansions described in the hosts_access(5) manual page. The command is executed with stdin, stdout and stderr connected to the null device, so that it won\'t mess up the conversation with the client host. Example: .sp .nf .ti +3 spawn (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | /usr/ucb/mail root) & .fi .sp executes, in a background child process, the shell command "safe_finger -l @%h | mail root" after replacing %h by the name or address of the remote host. .sp The example uses the "safe_finger" command instead of the regular "finger" command, to limit possible damage from data sent by the finger server. The "safe_finger" command is part of the daemon wrapper package; it is a wrapper around the regular finger command that filters the data sent by the remote host. .IP "twist shell_command" Replace the current process by an instance of the specified shell command, after performing the % expansions described in the hosts_access(5) manual page. Stdin, stdout and stderr are connected to the client process. This option must appear at the end of a rule. .sp To send a customized bounce message to the client instead of running the real ftp daemon: .sp .nf .ti +3 in.ftpd : ... : twist /bin/echo 421 Some bounce message .fi .sp For an alternative way to talk to client processes, see the \fIbanners\fR option below. .sp To run /some/other/in.telnetd without polluting its command-line array or its process environment: .sp .nf .ti +3 in.telnetd : ... : twist PATH=/some/other; exec in.telnetd .fi .sp Warning: in case of UDP services, do not twist to commands that use the standard I/O or the read(2)/write(2) routines to communicate with the client process; UDP requires other I/O primitives. .SH NETWORK OPTIONS .IP "keepalive" Causes the server to periodically send a message to the client. The connection is considered broken when the client does not respond. The keepalive option can be useful when users turn off their machine while it is still connected to a server. The keepalive option is not useful for datagram (UDP) services. .IP "linger number_of_seconds" Specifies how long the kernel will try to deliver not-yet delivered data after the server process closes a connection. .SH USERNAME LOOKUP .IP "rfc931 [ timeout_in_seconds ]" Look up the client user name with the RFC 931 (TAP, IDENT, RFC 1413) protocol. This option is silently ignored in case of services based on transports other than TCP. It requires that the client system runs an RFC 931 (IDENT, etc.) -compliant daemon, and may cause noticeable delays with connections from non-UNIX clients. The timeout period is optional. If no timeout is specified a compile-time defined default value is taken. .SH MISCELLANEOUS .IP "banners /some/directory" Look for a file in `/some/directory' with the same name as the daemon process (for example in.telnetd for the telnet service), and copy its contents to the client. Newline characters are replaced by carriage-return newline, and % sequences are expanded (see the hosts_access(5) manual page). .sp The tcp wrappers source code distribution provides a sample makefile (Banners.Makefile) for convenient banner maintenance. .sp Warning: banners are supported for connection-oriented (TCP) network services only. .IP "nice [ number ]" Change the nice value of the process (default 10). Specify a positive value to spend more CPU resources on other processes. .IP "setenv name value" Place a (name, value) pair into the process environment. The value is subjected to % expansions and may contain whitespace (but leading and trailing blanks are stripped off). .sp Warning: many network daemons reset their environment before spawning a login or shell process. .IP "umask 022" Like the umask command that is built into the shell. An umask of 022 prevents the creation of files with group and world write permission. The umask argument should be an octal number. .IP "user nobody" .IP "user nobody.kmem" Assume the privileges of the "nobody" userid (or user "nobody", group "kmem"). The first form is useful with inetd implementations that run all services with root privilege. The second form is useful for services that need special group privileges only. .SH DIAGNOSTICS When a syntax error is found in an access control rule, the error is reported to the syslog daemon; further options will be ignored, and service is denied. .SH SEE ALSO hosts_access(5), the default access control language .SH AUTHOR .na .nf Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl) Department of Mathematics and Computing Science Eindhoven University of Technology Den Dolech 2, P.O. Box 513, 5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands \" @(#) hosts_options.5 1.10 94/12/28 17:42:28 07070100008528000041ed00000064000000640000000233040ec400000000000000200000001b00000000000000000000001a00000009root/opt/WZVwrap/man/man807070100008529000081a4000000640000006400000001312b3ca400001b6e000000200000001b00000000000000000000002100000009root/opt/WZVwrap/man/man8/tcpd.8.TH TCPD 8 .SH NAME tcpd \- access control facility for internet services .SH DESCRIPTION .PP The \fItcpd\fR program can be set up to monitor incoming requests for \fItelnet\fR, \fIfinger\fR, \fIftp\fR, \fIexec\fR, \fIrsh\fR, \fIrlogin\fR, \fItftp\fR, \fItalk\fR, \fIcomsat\fR and other services that have a one-to-one mapping onto executable files. .PP The program supports both 4.3BSD-style sockets and System V.4-style TLI. Functionality may be limited when the protocol underneath TLI is not an internet protocol. .PP Operation is as follows: whenever a request for service arrives, the \fIinetd\fP daemon is tricked into running the \fItcpd\fP program instead of the desired server. \fItcpd\fP logs the request and does some additional checks. When all is well, \fItcpd\fP runs the appropriate server program and goes away. .PP Optional features are: pattern-based access control, client username lookups with the RFC 931 etc. protocol, protection against hosts that pretend to have someone elses host name, and protection against hosts that pretend to have someone elses network address. .SH LOGGING Connections that are monitored by .I tcpd are reported through the \fIsyslog\fR(3) facility. Each record contains a time stamp, the client host name and the name of the requested service. The information can be useful to detect unwanted activities, especially when logfile information from several hosts is merged. .PP In order to find out where your logs are going, examine the syslog configuration file, usually /etc/syslog.conf. .SH ACCESS CONTROL Optionally, .I tcpd supports a simple form of access control that is based on pattern matching. The access-control software provides hooks for the execution of shell commands when a pattern fires. For details, see the \fIhosts_access\fR(5) manual page. .SH HOST NAME VERIFICATION The authentication scheme of some protocols (\fIrlogin, rsh\fR) relies on host names. Some implementations believe the host name that they get from any random name server; other implementations are more careful but use a flawed algorithm. .PP .I tcpd verifies the client host name that is returned by the address->name DNS server by looking at the host name and address that are returned by the name->address DNS server. If any discrepancy is detected, .I tcpd concludes that it is dealing with a host that pretends to have someone elses host name. .PP If the sources are compiled with -DPARANOID, .I tcpd will drop the connection in case of a host name/address mismatch. Otherwise, the hostname can be matched with the \fIPARANOID\fR wildcard, after which suitable action can be taken. .SH HOST ADDRESS SPOOFING Optionally, .I tcpd disables source-routing socket options on every connection that it deals with. This will take care of most attacks from hosts that pretend to have an address that belongs to someone elses network. UDP services do not benefit from this protection. This feature must be turned on at compile time. .SH RFC 931 When RFC 931 etc. lookups are enabled (compile-time option) \fItcpd\fR will attempt to establish the name of the client user. This will succeed only if the client host runs an RFC 931-compliant daemon. Client user name lookups will not work for datagram-oriented connections, and may cause noticeable delays in the case of connections from PCs. .SH EXAMPLES The details of using \fItcpd\fR depend on pathname information that was compiled into the program. .SH EXAMPLE 1 This example applies when \fItcpd\fR expects that the original network daemons will be moved to an "other" place. .PP In order to monitor access to the \fIfinger\fR service, move the original finger daemon to the "other" place and install tcpd in the place of the original finger daemon. No changes are required to configuration files. .nf .sp .in +5 # mkdir /other/place # mv /usr/etc/in.fingerd /other/place # cp tcpd /usr/etc/in.fingerd .fi .PP The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, or have no `in.\' prefix to their name. .SH EXAMPLE 2 This example applies when \fItcpd\fR expects that the network daemons are left in their original place. .PP In order to monitor access to the \fIfinger\fR service, perform the following edits on the \fIinetd\fR configuration file (usually \fI/etc/inetd.conf\fR or \fI/etc/inet/inetd.conf\fR): .nf .sp .ti +5 finger stream tcp nowait nobody /usr/etc/in.fingerd in.fingerd .sp becomes: .sp .ti +5 finger stream tcp nowait nobody /some/where/tcpd in.fingerd .sp .fi .PP The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, the daemons have no `in.\' prefix to their name, or there is no userid field in the inetd configuration file. .PP Similar changes will be needed for the other services that are to be covered by \fItcpd\fR. Send a `kill -HUP\' to the \fIinetd\fR(8) process to make the changes effective. AIX users may also have to execute the `inetimp\' command. .SH EXAMPLE 3 In the case of daemons that do not live in a common directory ("secret" or otherwise), edit the \fIinetd\fR configuration file so that it specifies an absolute path name for the process name field. For example: .nf .sp ntalk dgram udp wait root /some/where/tcpd /usr/local/lib/ntalkd .sp .fi .PP Only the last component (ntalkd) of the pathname will be used for access control and logging. .SH BUGS Some UDP (and RPC) daemons linger around for a while after they have finished their work, in case another request comes in. In the inetd configuration file these services are registered with the \fIwait\fR option. Only the request that started such a daemon will be logged. .PP The program does not work with RPC services over TCP. These services are registered as \fIrpc/tcp\fR in the inetd configuration file. The only non-trivial service that is affected by this limitation is \fIrexd\fR, which is used by the \fIon(1)\fR command. This is no great loss. On most systems, \fIrexd\fR is less secure than a wildcard in /etc/hosts.equiv. .PP RPC broadcast requests (for example: \fIrwall, rup, rusers\fR) always appear to come from the responding host. What happens is that the client broadcasts the request to all \fIportmap\fR daemons on its network; each \fIportmap\fR daemon forwards the request to a local daemon. As far as the \fIrwall\fR etc. daemons know, the request comes from the local host. .SH FILES .PP The default locations of the host access control tables are: .PP /etc/hosts.allow .br /etc/hosts.deny .SH SEE ALSO .na .nf hosts_access(5), format of the tcpd access control tables. syslog.conf(5), format of the syslogd control file. inetd.conf(5), format of the inetd control file. .SH AUTHORS .na .nf Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl), Department of Mathematics and Computing Science, Eindhoven University of Technology Den Dolech 2, P.O. Box 513, 5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands \" @(#) tcpd.8 1.5 96/02/21 16:39:16 0707010000852a000081a40000006400000064000000012f100c1f00000a0a000000200000001b00000000000000000000002400000009root/opt/WZVwrap/man/man8/tcpdchk.8.TH TCPDCHK 8 .SH NAME tcpdchk \- tcp wrapper configuration checker .SH SYNOPSYS tcpdchk [-a] [-d] [-i inet_conf] [-v] .SH DESCRIPTION .PP \fItcpdchk\fR examines your tcp wrapper configuration and reports all potential and real problems it can find. The program examines the \fItcpd\fR access control files (by default, these are \fI/etc/hosts.allow\fR and \fI/etc/hosts.deny\fR), and compares the entries in these files against entries in the \fIinetd\fR or \fItlid\fR network configuration files. .PP \fItcpdchk\fR reports problems such as non-existent pathnames; services that appear in \fItcpd\fR access control rules, but are not controlled by \fItcpd\fR; services that should not be wrapped; non-existent host names or non-internet address forms; occurrences of host aliases instead of official host names; hosts with a name/address conflict; inappropriate use of wildcard patterns; inappropriate use of NIS netgroups or references to non-existent NIS netgroups; references to non-existent options; invalid arguments to options; and so on. .PP Where possible, \fItcpdchk\fR provides a helpful suggestion to fix the problem. .SH OPTIONS .IP -a Report access control rules that permit access without an explicit ALLOW keyword. This applies only when the extended access control language is enabled (build with -DPROCESS_OPTIONS). .IP -d Examine \fIhosts.allow\fR and \fIhosts.deny\fR files in the current directory instead of the default ones. .IP "-i inet_conf" Specify this option when \fItcpdchk\fR is unable to find your \fIinetd.conf\fR or \fItlid.conf\fR network configuration file, or when you suspect that the program uses the wrong one. .IP -v Display the contents of each access control rule. Daemon lists, client lists, shell commands and options are shown in a pretty-printed format; this makes it easier for you to spot any discrepancies between what you want and what the program understands. .SH FILES .PP The default locations of the \fItcpd\fR access control tables are: .PP /etc/hosts.allow .br /etc/hosts.deny .SH SEE ALSO .na .nf tcpdmatch(8), explain what tcpd would do in specific cases. hosts_access(5), format of the tcpd access control tables. hosts_options(5), format of the language extensions. inetd.conf(5), format of the inetd control file. tlid.conf(5), format of the tlid control file. .SH AUTHORS .na .nf Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl), Department of Mathematics and Computing Science, Eindhoven University of Technology Den Dolech 2, P.O. Box 513, 5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands \" @(#) tcpdchk.8 1.3 95/01/08 17:00:30 0707010000852b000081a4000000640000006400000001311e12e000000cb4000000200000001b00000000000000000000002600000009root/opt/WZVwrap/man/man8/tcpdmatch.8.TH TCPDMATCH 8 .SH NAME tcpdmatch \- tcp wrapper oracle .SH SYNOPSYS tcpdmatch [-d] [-i inet_conf] daemon client .sp tcpdmatch [-d] [-i inet_conf] daemon[@server] [user@]client .SH DESCRIPTION .PP \fItcpdmatch\fR predicts how the tcp wrapper would handle a specific request for service. Examples are given below. .PP The program examines the \fItcpd\fR access control tables (default \fI/etc/hosts.allow\fR and \fI/etc/hosts.deny\fR) and prints its conclusion. For maximal accuracy, it extracts additional information from your \fIinetd\fR or \fItlid\fR network configuration file. .PP When \fItcpdmatch\fR finds a match in the access control tables, it identifies the matched rule. In addition, it displays the optional shell commands or options in a pretty-printed format; this makes it easier for you to spot any discrepancies between what you want and what the program understands. .SH ARGUMENTS The following two arguments are always required: .IP daemon A daemon process name. Typically, the last component of a daemon executable pathname. .IP client A host name or network address, or one of the `unknown' or `paranoid' wildcard patterns. .sp When a client host name is specified, \fItcpdmatch\fR gives a prediction for each address listed for that client. .sp When a client address is specified, \fItcpdmatch\fR predicts what \fItcpd\fR would do when client name lookup fails. .PP Optional information specified with the \fIdaemon@server\fR form: .IP server A host name or network address, or one of the `unknown' or `paranoid' wildcard patterns. The default server name is `unknown'. .PP Optional information specified with the \fIuser@client\fR form: .IP user A client user identifier. Typically, a login name or a numeric userid. The default user name is `unknown'. .SH OPTIONS .IP -d Examine \fIhosts.allow\fR and \fIhosts.deny\fR files in the current directory instead of the default ones. .IP "-i inet_conf" Specify this option when \fItcpdmatch\fR is unable to find your \fIinetd.conf\fR or \fItlid.conf\fR network configuration file, or when you suspect that the program uses the wrong one. .SH EXAMPLES To predict how \fItcpd\fR would handle a telnet request from the local system: .sp .ti +5 tcpdmatch in.telnetd localhost .PP The same request, pretending that hostname lookup failed: .sp .ti +5 tcpdmatch in.telnetd 127.0.0.1 .PP To predict what tcpd would do when the client name does not match the client address: .sp .ti +5 tcpdmatch in.telnetd paranoid .PP On some systems, daemon names have no `in.' prefix, or \fItcpdmatch\fR may need some help to locate the inetd configuration file. .SH FILES .PP The default locations of the \fItcpd\fR access control tables are: .PP /etc/hosts.allow .br /etc/hosts.deny .SH SEE ALSO .na .nf tcpdchk(8), tcpd configuration checker hosts_access(5), format of the tcpd access control tables. hosts_options(5), format of the language extensions. inetd.conf(5), format of the inetd control file. tlid.conf(5), format of the tlid control file. .SH AUTHORS .na .nf Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl), Department of Mathematics and Computing Science, Eindhoven University of Technology Den Dolech 2, P.O. Box 513, 5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands \" @(#) tcpdmatch.8 1.5 96/02/11 17:01:35 070701000093f1000041ed00000064000000640000000233040ec400000000000000200000001b00000000000000000000001600000009root/opt/WZVwrap/sbin070701000093f2000081a4000000640000006400000001330404c50000217c000000200000001b00000000000000000000002200000009root/opt/WZVwrap/sbin/safe_fingerELF \44 (44    /usr/lib/ld.so.15HG<A)C(F$,!5@B#41E*D-+ 3>=6'.28;&079:%/?"d  $ \@T h       \t@"@!'0  FK SP=X|_gnsy@0(d 4$ p@4!L  . 5  <h IN !U X8ZcT ioX_startsetuid_environ_endfork_iob__flsbuf_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_pipe__ctypepathsignalgeteuidatexitexitalarmfinger_pid_initdupgetuidpipe_stdingetpwnamfclosewaitcleanup_DYNAMICprintf__iobsetgid_exitenvironperrorperror_exitputenvcloseopen_edata_PROCEDURE_LINKAGE_TABLE_execvp_etext_lib_versionkill_ctypemain__filbuf_finifstatfprintflibsocket.so.1libnsl.so.1libc.so.1!3%&5A+$(-44@L9XGd.p2|#'D/7F; :* > @D# @AD T@A@l, @ "@(@A@A㿐@/A/A8  `    㿐㿐!@A @A 㿈 @A D@A D@A p" !  $!@A  @A##@A@A#P D!D`x@A@@Az @A!D @A! &@@"a B@Ac4@A <'!a"3!#Ḑ? $@A~ `%  @?^Ф  aȐ? &aȐ @Aja ``$`*@ܰ  D@AQ Ȱ ?aȐ? &aȐ @AQa ` $` * ?'D  _" \aȐ? &aȐ \@A9a ``$`*@ aȐ? &aȐ @A*a ``$`*@ D @A  !@A!@!@ 쀢  㿐@A @@Ԑ  %D1D@A`?2  @@ "    @@耢 Dݐ @@? 0Dѐ!@@@@ @@쀢 DŐ!@@@@@ߒ@@@@@Ӑ @@耢 D!@@㿐@/@/@, ? ???㿐㿠㿠nobody%s: putenv: out of memoryfinger Input truncated to %d bytes... \ \%03o/dev/nullopen /dev/nullpipeforkdupw @ Td  8 $ \ 00<0H0T0`0l0x00000000000000 0,080D0P0\0@(#) safe_finger.c 1.4 94/12/28 17:42:41PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/ucb:/usr/bsd:/etc:/usr/etc:/usr/sbind  $ \@T h        +9G ] l z ( ) 44  \t@!*/4@!9B  X] eP=j|qy@0(d 4$ p@4! L& @ G  Nh [` !g X8luT {Xsafe_fingercrti.svalues-Xa.ccrtstuff.c__CTOR_LIST____DTOR_LIST____do_global_dtors_auxgcc2_compiled.force_to_datafini_dummysafe_finger.csccsidgcc2_compiled.crtstuff.c__do_global_ctors_auxgcc2_compiled.force_to_datainit_dummy__DTOR_END____CTOR_END__crtn.s_startsetuid_environ_endfork_iob__flsbuf_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_pipe__ctypepathsignalgeteuidatexitexitalarmfinger_pid_initdupgetuidpipe_stdingetpwnamfclosewaitcleanup_DYNAMICprintf__iobsetgid_exitenvironperrorperror_exitputenvcloseopen_edata_PROCEDURE_LINKAGE_TABLE_execvp_etext_lib_versionkill_ctypemain__filbuf_finifstatfprintf <@(#)SunOS 5.5.1 Generic May 1996as: SC4.0 dev 15 Feb 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.0 dev 15 Feb 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2ld: (SGU) SunOS/ELF (LK-2.0 (S/I) - versioning).interp.hash.dynsym.dynstr.rela.bss.rela.plt.text.init.fini.rodata.got.dynamic.plt.data.ctors.dtors.bss.symtab.strtab.stab.index.comment.shstrtab.stab.indexstrvalues-Xa.cXt ; V=2.0  dd $ ) $ $8  3 \ \9@@?TTEhhM  R[l `  mfmtXy-p 070701000093f3000081a4000000640000006400000001330404b1000084a8000000200000001b00000000000000000000001b00000009root/opt/WZVwrap/sbin/tcpdELF44 (44S.S.S0S0 |S<S</usr/lib/ld.so.1%w;@>]).kxdO<p:zuYas9jZrhX7lQ(gy{AV,!f=D}#BW_C Mi8v\G6[eo+|q^FS-&0/2PNE4*RT13m'U"c`LJH5t~?$InbK8pI`It I S0 S< S XP]]]WV,t 5p,X:WF4DTU[TbcjWw5XTVDXci,F848UX05DS0 V c 6t4X!X/V6TdATHX<PTUVP[XmW~WTXWVTL6X&89HDVh6T<<GI` U9 "U&T(,<|@:eATHWLYWdaY ie0rUy>(eWXHHU<UTf`VVDVVW4H|8 S< eV(U.f`;UB;LTRV\YUT`4ldjUvV|UlX$U0WpF,T@V8Tc!i i$\)T2pVW(XWW(U.V 3U$9X EXLUHRWZgWrT]S TeGh,[T4S. 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"*`@㿈 @Dٔ  T@!@D 0@D͔@DĒ 㿈 @D.   ) ` $ @ @D?'@ @Dy`     @ @Dj`$@ &  & hQ!h#T``2 * EEEEEEEEE@b0`&`&"`&#    !!""`@D& , 㿐'H'L'P'T'XH`H@D#<?& @CwcH@Dt!T@Cvb&"&#$㿐'H'L'P'T'XH㿐!$@C @Co@J 2 ` `$`J \2  &@ .` 㿐@Ca * 㿐  N J@ . 2` `J@  .?@D 㻐!$ !$Tc@C Tc@B @C㿐'H'L'P'T'X Tc ܖH㿐'H'L'P'T'X Tc(ΖH!@C ?㿐@/B/B0 ? ???㿐㿠㿠%s/%s/usr/sbinconnect from %serror: cannot execute %s: %m/etc/opt/WZVwrap/hosts.allow/etc/opt/WZVwrap/hosts.denyrmissing newline or line too long missing ":" separatorcannot open %s: %mmatched: %s line %dEXCEPTKNOWNLOCAL01234567890./ALLbad net/mask expression: %s/%sbannersdenyallowseveritynicesetenvrfc931twistspawnkeepalivelingerumaskgroupusermissing option namebad option name: "%s"option "%s" requires valueoption "%s" requires no valueoption "%s" must be at endoption: %s %s%s/%sr %s: %munknown group: "%s"setgid(%s): %munknown user: "%s"setuid(%s): %m%o%cbad umask value: "%s"%d%cbad linger value: "%s"setsockopt SO_LINGER %d: %msetsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %mbad nice value: "%s"nice(%d): %mtwist option in resident processtwist %s to %stwist_option: dup: %m/bin/shsh-ctwist_option: /bin/sh: %mbad rfc931 timeout: "%s"memory allocation failurelocal7local6local5local4local3local2local1local0cronuucpnewslprauthdaemonmailkerndebuginfonoticewarningerrcritalertemergbad syslog facility or severity: "%s"rule ends in ":"cannot fork: %m/dev/nullopen /dev/null: %mdup: %m/bin/shsh-cexecl /bin/sh: %msocket: %mr+fdopen: %m%u,%u %u , %u : USERID :%*[^:]:%255s%s@%srefused connect from %sunrecognized %%%c%percent_x: expansion too long: %.30s...%s=%stimodiprefused connect from %s with IP source routing options %2.2xconnect from %s with IP options (ignored):%ssetsockopt IP_OPTIONS NULL: %mcan't get client address: %mgetsockname: %mcan't verify hostname: gethostbyname(%s) failedlocalhosthost name/name mismatch: %s != %shost name/address mismatch: %s != %sinett_alloc: %scan't get client address: %sTI_GETMYNAME: %mfstat(fd %d): %msetnetconfig: %munable to identify transport protocolgetnetconfigent(%s): %scan't verify hostname: netdir_getbyname(%s) failedhost name/address mismatch: %s != %sUnknown TLI error %dUnknown UNIX error %drequest_fill: invalid key: %d%d%s: %s, line %d: %s%s: %swarningerrorS<]] I` It8  SDp 00<0H0T0`0l0x00000000000000 0,080D0P0\0h0t0000000000000~0{0x(0u40r@0oL0lX0id0fp0c|0`0]0Z0W0T0Q0N0K0H0E0B0? 0<09$06003<00H0-T0*`0'l0$x0!0000000 0 00000 0,080D0P0\0h0@(#) tcpd.c 1.10 96/02/11 17:01:32@(#) patchlevel 7.5 97/02/12 02:13:24@(#) hosts_access.c 1.21 97/02/12 02:13:22, II@(#) options.c 1.17 96/02/11 17:01:31= K`*(KX)KP*KH+0K8+K0+K(,K -K.TK,$K/J(TJ(pJ(NhK`N`NXNP NH0N@8N8@N0xN(N NNNNMMNNNNNNNxNpL@(#) shell_cmd.c 1.5 94/12/28 17:42:44@(#) rfc931.c 1.10 95/01/02 16:11:34 @(#) eval.c 1.3 95/01/30 19:51:45unknownparanoid@(#) refuse.c 1.5 94/12/28 17:42:39@(#) percent_x.c 1.4 94/12/28 17:42:371234567890!@%-_=+:,./abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ@(#) clean_exit.c 1.4 94/12/28 17:42:19@(#) setenv.c 1.1 93/03/07 22:47:58@(#) fromhost.c 1.17 94/12/28 17:42:23@(#) fix_options.c 1.4 97/02/12 02:13:22@(#) socket.c 1.14 95/01/30 19:51:50@(#) tli.c 1.14 95/01/03 22:26:03@(#) workarounds.c 1.6 96/03/19 16:22:25@(#) update.c 1.1 94/12/28 17:42:56@(#) misc.c 1.2 96/02/11 17:01:29@(#) diag.c 1.1 94/12/28 17:42:208pI`It I S0 S< S XP]]] $]2]@(V(eXPs~XP#Xx&"hlXX+$X!4P "%$"d1;*(G+PX/b(To*X|Y.TpY0+(X&-l)hY(+0(4,D&Z(p'0Xt3,$?/OYWZxH_.Plx10Z'0Z%1]02T1d[ "4l]^[`$ 6t&['-6<[JGT\([8js\($z8\P'9H\x)9_\%_=0; Cd`8$AH1AX>\"E`(OC4Y?g@u>(`(?,TDX]($E,`H<E,]P"F Hh]x"$H3>HTHc]qIT|]]WV,t5pXW4DUTcW5XT!V0DXBcKi,PF]84h8oUtX0{5DS0 Vc 6t4XXVTdTX<TVPX WW"TX*W:VATLI6XU&8e9HDnVhs6}T<<GI`U9 UT(<|@eTWLWdY e0U>(e(W5XFHHPU<WU`Tgf`sVzVDVVW4H|8S< eVUf`U;TV\UT4ld U V Ul !X$ +U0 1Wp <F, HT@ PV8 WT ]c! ei  ki$ x\) T 2p V W( X W W U V  U$ X  X UH W  W T $] +S ET Ke TGh, ][ lT4 sS. zI [H V T| W@ c ! U T U @ Tp F [P  V X T U  W U` It WX W )0d 3W| 9V AU IUx RVttcpdcrti.svalues-Xa.ccrtstuff.c__CTOR_LIST____DTOR_LIST____do_global_dtors_auxgcc2_compiled.force_to_datafini_dummytcpd.csccsidpatchlevelgcc2_compiled.hosts_access.cclient_matchmydomain.20sccsidstring_matchgcc2_compiled.seplist_matchtable_matchhost_matchmasked_matchserver_matchoptions.cuser_optionkeepalive_optionget_fieldallow_optionumask_optionon.28setenv_optionoption_tablespawn_optionsccsidrfc931_optiongroup_optionwhitespace_eqlinger_optionbanners_optiontwist_optiongcc2_compiled.last.43deny_optionchop_stringnice_optionseverity_optionlog_faclog_sevseverity_mapshell_cmd.cdo_childsccsidgcc2_compiled.rfc931.csccsidgcc2_compiled.timebuftimeoutfsocketeval.csccsidgcc2_compiled.both.10both.13refuse.csccsidgcc2_compiled.percent_x.csccsidgcc2_compiled.ok_chars.2clean_exit.csccsidgcc2_compiled.setenv.csccsidgcc2_compiled.fromhost.csccsidgcc2_compiled.fix_options.csccsidgcc2_compiled.socket.cserver.11sccsidclient.10sock_sinkgcc2_compiled.tli.ctli_sinkserver.11tli_hostnametli_hostaddrsccsidclient.10tli_errortli_endpointstli_transportgcc2_compiled.buf.24tli_cleanupworkarounds.cgcc2_compiled.update.csccsidgcc2_compiled.default_info.4request_fillmisc.csccsicgcc2_compiled.diag.ctcpd_diagsccsidgcc2_compiled.crtstuff.c__do_global_ctors_auxgcc2_compiled.force_to_datainit_dummy__DTOR_END____CTOR_END__crtn.snetdir_getbynamesocket_starteval_clientdeny_severitygetpeernameeval_hostaddrsetuidstrtokt_errnosetnetconfigeval_hostinfogetprotobynamefix_gethostbyname_environ_endrequest_initclean_exitsetenvforkgetpideval_hostname_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_sleep__ctyperefuseresidentgethostbynamesignalstrcasecmpatexitvsyslogexitalarmhosts_allow_tablenetdir_getbyaddr__minoropenloggetnetconfigentmallocsprintfeval_serverprocess_optionsfromhostbindpercent_xinnetgrsock_hostnamedot_quad_addr_initsetsockoptfix_optionsdupumasksock_hostaddrt_nerrsetjmpfreenetconfigentt_allocdry_runtcpd_bufsscanftli_host_sys_nerrgetnetconfighosts_deny_tabletcpd_jumpungetcgetpwnamfclosesys_errlistgetenvsetbufwaitstrncpygethostbyaddrtcpd_warn_DYNAMICt_errlistgetsockoptexecl_sys_errlistsetgidsock_hostexecvfilenostrcateval_userstrncasecmpioctlgetgrnaminet_addrwritet_rcvudatarequest_setstrrchrfdopen_exitenvironerrnotcpd_contextsccsidstrchrrfc931putenvinet_ntoahosts_access_verbosefreegetsocknamecloseopenfgetcnetdir_freestrcmpfgets__majorhosts_accessnc_sperroryp_get_default_domain_edata_PROCEDURE_LINKAGE_TABLE_fopensys_nerrsplit_atrfc931_timeoutstrcpy_etext_lib_versionunknownfflushcloselogmemcmp_ctypenicestrspnendpwentmainsyslogxgetsparanoidmemcpyallow_severitystrlenstrcspntaddr2uaddrstat_finit_freerecvfromshell_cmdfstatfprintflongjmpendgrentconnect <@(#)SunOS 5.5.1 Generic May 1996as: SC4.0 dev 15 Feb 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.0 dev 15 Feb 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2ld: (SGU) SunOS/ELF (LK-2.0 (S/I) - versioning).interp.hash.dynsym.dynstr.rela.bss.rela.plt.text.init.fini.rodata.got.dynamic.plt.data.ctors.dtors.bss.symtab.strtab.stab.index.comment.shstrtab.stab.indexstrvalues-Xa.cXt ; 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'@F@F . 㿈!J F @F @@@F . @HU#@J.@E@  U@Ec0 U#@`  , @@Fg   `, @ 2, '@FQU#h@@@Eʒbx 'ܐ$ @F6܁㿈 @FB.   ) ` $ @ @F2?'@ @EĢ`     @ @E`$@ &  & hP##U``2 * CCCCDCDDC@c0`&`&"`&#    !!""`@Eє , 㿐'H'L'P'T'XHb@Eg#<?& @E:b@EȠ!U@EKc&"&#$㿐'H'L'P'T'XH㿐#ܐ@EX @E@J 2 ` `$`J \2  &@ .` 㿐@E * 㿐  N J@ . 2` `J@  .?@E]㻐#܀ #ܐUc@D Uc@Dі 㿐'H'L'P'T'X UcؔܖH㿐'H'L'P'T'X UcΖH @DȒ?㿐@ ).#'!xN@ %2 N` m2 c4@6 U`*`@Dv@0Uc@Dc@D_``@ ,㿐@/D/D  ? ???㿐㿠㿠/etc/opt/WZVwrap/hosts.allow/etc/opt/WZVwrap/hosts.denyadi:vhosts.allowhosts.deny/usr/sbinREAL_DAEMON_DIR %s: %mREAL_DAEMON_DIR %s is not a directoryUsing network configuration file: %s portmaprpcbinddaemon_nameserver_hostnameserver_addruser_nameclient_hostnameclient_addrusage: %s [-a] [-d] [-i inet_conf] [-v] -a: report rules with implicit "ALLOW" at end -d: use allow/deny files in current directory -i: location of inetd.conf file -v: list all rules rmissing newline or line too long missing ":" separator >>> Rule %s line %d: daemons: clients: implicit "allow" at end of ruleaccess: %s granteddeniedcannot open %s: %m EXCEPThost %s has more than one address(consider using an address instead)daemon list is empty or ends in EXCEPTclient list is empty or ends in EXCEPT%s: daemon name begins with "@"%s: daemon name begins with dot%s: daemon name ends in dotALLFAILFAIL is no longer recognized(use EXCEPT or DENY instead)%s: daemon name may be reserved word%s: no such process name in %s%s: service possibly not wrapped%s: user name begins with "@"%s: user name begins with dot%s: user name ends in dotKNOWN%s: user name may be reserved word%s: unknown or empty netgroup%s/%s: bad net/mask pattern01234567890./%s: domain or host name ends in dot0.0.0.0255.255.255.255%s: network number begins with dotLOCAL /etc/tlid.conf/etc/saf/tlid.conf/etc/net/tlid.conf/etc/inetd.conf/usr/etc/inetd.conf/etc/inet/inetd.conf/private/etc/inetd.confropen %s: %m Cannot find your inetd.conf or tlid.conf file. Please specify its location. streamdgraminternal-0123456789incomplete line0123456789%s: not found: %m%s: not executablemiscdrexdrpc.rexd%s may be an insecure servicetcpd%s is recursively calling itself%s: file is set-uid or set-gid%s inserted before %s%s/%s/usr/sbin%s: not found in %s: %m%s: file lookup: %mrpc/tcp%s: cannot wrap rpc/tcp servicesout of memory Sorry, out of memory 01234567890./%s: not an internet address%s: host not found%d: not an internet host%s: hostname alias(official name: %s)host address %s->name lookup failedcommand: %s%s: world writable/bannersdenyallowseveritynicesetenvrfc931twistspawnkeepalivelingerumaskgroupusermissing option namebad option name: "%s"option "%s" requires valueoption "%s" requires no valueoption "%s" must be at endoption: %s %s%s/%sr %s: %munknown group: "%s"setgid(%s): %munknown user: "%s"setuid(%s): %m%o%cbad umask value: "%s"%d%cbad linger value: "%s"setsockopt SO_LINGER %d: %msetsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %mbad nice value: "%s"nice(%d): %mtwist option in resident processtwist %s to %stwist_option: dup: %m/bin/shsh-ctwist_option: /bin/sh: %mbad rfc931 timeout: "%s"memory allocation failurelocal7local6local5local4local3local2local1local0cronuucpnewslprauthdaemonmailkerndebuginfonoticewarningerrcritalertemergbad syslog facility or severity: "%s"rule ends in ":"%s@%sunrecognized %%%c%percent_x: expansion too long: %.30s...%s=%scan't get client address: %mgetsockname: %mcan't verify hostname: gethostbyname(%s) failedlocalhosthost name/name mismatch: %s != %shost name/address mismatch: %s != %srequest_fill: invalid key: %d%d%s: %s, line %d: %s%s: %swarningerrorUnknown error %dX```\ H< HP  X< 00<0H0T0`0l0x00000000000000 0,080D0P0\0h0t0000000000000~0{0x(0u40r@0oL0lX0id0fp0c|0`0]0Z0W0T0Q0N0K0H0E0B0? 0<@(#) tcpdchk.c 1.8 97/02/12 02:13:25, HpH@(#) fakelog.c 1.3 94/12/28 17:42:21@(#) inetcf.c 1.7 97/02/12 02:13:23O ONNNNN @(#) scaffold.c 1.5 95/01/03 09:13:48 @(#) options.c 1.17 96/02/11 17:01:31= R4R4hR5XR5R6|R5R7LR8R8R6R9Rx2Rp3Rh34URUUU U0U8U@UxUUUUUUUxUpV(V VVVVUUS@(#) eval.c 1.3 95/01/30 19:51:45unknownparanoid@(#) percent_x.c 1.4 94/12/28 17:42:371234567890!@%-_=+:,./abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ@(#) setenv.c 1.1 93/03/07 22:47:58@(#) socket.c 1.14 95/01/30 19:51:50@(#) workarounds.c 1.6 96/03/19 16:22:25@(#) update.c 1.1 94/12/28 17:42:56@(#) misc.c 1.2 96/02/11 17:01:29@(#) diag.c 1.1 94/12/28 17:42:20@(#) percent_m.c 1.1 94/12/28 17:42:37H<HP Hh W X X [`X```h '`X5``C\Y\h[v h<$|[%p[!"`t0`l%`p1`h>H\%O% ^g,x$q( z\($\l%\p,`x,\x&`46|P :@2#5XX0]68pD\Q5(^\&e8ls4hh\53447LD0^x3;t69] ^0H9lP '^".;t=`EaMY^'`=|o^Jz_8$?db_`%bBH0?Bx_$CLb<!CL.5_"<DKRF4h\`"cF4r~`0'GGG`WH0`d`\Xt <p\&[42;D@ZGYlN<`T\Bxnewk|D8/?d[h8@!<DW [e [[YxX%8 X[!% )Y0Y8=$XDGN08^=|hA <vEH<ZZ0$@@ZYYT-Y<Y\h0Zh4[FH#ZP*Z3YH:ix`F[M[dU[pc,dlF8vX %$Yh8@[ix`Z?Zh;td+`Zt[D,ZDYXe!kk!_)([/06[(=[XG[\Zakh[LtZzkZ8\L Z\`hX YYh4E,\.$Y`W Hh ^ Y %| $[| +e ! 2Z 7Y0 >Y JZ SP X%L0 _D eY q^  zY Y$ \ Z  Z HP [@ /, Y  Z, Y Ztcpdchkcrti.svalues-Xa.ccrtstuff.c__CTOR_LIST____DTOR_LIST____do_global_dtors_auxgcc2_compiled.force_to_datafini_dummytcpdchk.ccheck_daemonreserved_namesccsidusagecheck_client_listcheck_daemon_listgcc2_compiled.sepcheck_usercheck_hostinetcfparse_tableprint_listmynameallow_checkdefl_verdictfakelog.csccsidgcc2_compiled.inetcf.cbase_nameinet_chksccsidinet_listgcc2_compiled.whitespacescaffold.cdup_hostenth.12gcc2_compiled.sccs_idaddr_list.13options.cuser_optionkeepalive_optionget_fieldallow_optionumask_optionon.28setenv_optionoption_tablespawn_optionsccsidrfc931_optiongroup_optionwhitespace_eqlinger_optionbanners_optiontwist_optiongcc2_compiled.last.43deny_optionchop_stringnice_optionseverity_optionlog_faclog_sevseverity_mapeval.csccsidgcc2_compiled.both.10both.13percent_x.csccsidgcc2_compiled.ok_chars.2setenv.csccsidgcc2_compiled.socket.cserver.11sccsidclient.10sock_sinkgcc2_compiled.workarounds.cgcc2_compiled.update.csccsidgcc2_compiled.default_info.4request_fillmisc.csccsicgcc2_compiled.diag.ctcpd_diagsccsidgcc2_compiled.percent_m.csccsidgcc2_compiled.crtstuff.c__do_global_ctors_auxgcc2_compiled.force_to_datainit_dummy__DTOR_END____CTOR_END__crtn.sgetopt_starteval_clientdeny_severitygetpeernameeval_hostaddrsetuidstrtokeval_hostinfofix_gethostbyname_environ_endrequest_initclean_exitsetenvgetpid_iobeval_hostname_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_sleep__ctyperesidentgethostbynamestrcasecmpatexitvsyslogexithosts_allow_tableopenlogmallocsprintfeval_serverpercent_mprocess_optionspercent_xsock_hostnamedot_quad_addr_initsetsockoptdupcheck_pathsock_hostaddrumask.umulfputsfind_inet_addrsetjmpendnetgrentdry_runtcpd_bufsscanf_sys_nerrhosts_deny_tabletcpd_jumpungetcgetpwnamfclosesys_errlistgetenvstrncpygethostbyaddrinet_gettcpd_warn_DYNAMICinet_cfgprintf__iobexecl_sys_errlistsetgidsock_hoststrcateval_userinet_setgetgrnaminet_addrrequest_setwritestrrchr_exitenvironerrnotcpd_contextsccsidstrchrrfc931putenvinet_ntoahosts_access_verbosefreeoptindgetsocknamecloseoptargfgetcinet_filesfgets_edata_PROCEDURE_LINKAGE_TABLE_fopenmemsetsys_nerrsplit_atrfc931_timeoutcheck_dnsstrcpy_etext_lib_versionunknownfflushcloselogmemcmp_ctypenicestrspngetnetgrentendpwentmainsyslogxgetssetnetgrentparanoidmemcpystrlenallow_severitystrcspnstat_finirecvfromshell_cmdfprintflongjmpvprintfendgrent <@(#)SunOS 5.5.1 Generic May 1996as: SC4.0 dev 15 Feb 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.2 dev 30 Nov 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2as: SC4.0 dev 15 Feb 1995 GCC: (GNU) 2.7.2ld: (SGU) SunOS/ELF (LK-2.0 (S/I) - versioning).interp.hash.dynsym.dynstr.rela.bss.rela.plt.text.init.fini.rodata.got.dynamic.plt.data.ctors.dtors.bss.symtab.strtab.stab.index.comment.shstrtab.stab.indexstrvalues-Xa.cXt ; V=2.0   T )  30T9H<H<?HPHPEHhHhMWW RXX[XX `[[f`X`Xm````t`h`h y`hqH {( {@"~b070701000093f5000081a4000000640000006400000001330404bd000084bc000000200000001b00000000000000000000002000000009root/opt/WZVwrap/sbin/tcpdmatchELF44 (44YIYIYLYLYXYX/usr/lib/ld.so.1%a$TI^)LdD* gwmi_[]NJc{qfvU#9|;sO<xC}Yy@:,3z4H>jlZ/GkXWrtPS&'"8!BK7-VRM60(Q`FeE?+n5h=op\1uAb2.~ K`Kt K YL YX Y ]aaaZDt?p])\5>DC\JZQ?T_EqgXzmTG\+B\i@!?@DYL \`g` ^\ZhZ  8 Z,^$ ,Z3Z;@HXGJ@Q38a@k[LsD0<HK`\$\H+C@\[)[4^Pil0\ i^IH[#[,Z3j`?\lF\N\\'deI8oYX x!X$Zi@\Tj`[C [>d[d'`[\G,[ZPZ8 gX!m@mD&a)-[X4+;\xB\L^aZfmLm\y\<mP[]t [,[@aY ZZtiH,]*x$[ YI 'K 4` <ZC!PL\Sg` !Z\0_Z\f[o@t! 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T#@ `?㻐@^"X@X @@IՒL``=" N, @IN =2 N. @IybYN " L U@T 8"`"` " @Ig "    U P@<    U h@2    U @'   U @    $@@"  U ؐ U`˔ €}㿐!l@IT 㿐!l@IM?U`@I`U@I`袒1!U@I<  @@I9 0@I9'U?##@I3 @n @I,(@a@@H@I@H0 ?cx@H U @㿐@I U!@@I"P  @I  U!@㿐@, . ߒ@HU!(@r@H"P  @H` U!@@c㿈UaP@Hߖ뀢 U a U!X@O@H㿐"P 㿀Uap@H瀢 U쀢 U!x@/"P 쀠@ '@?c @H  U!@ 㿐"P ?@c @H  U@!㿈 'Uap@H~뀢 U!@"P  @Hz쀢 U!@㿐bP I"bP" U@֐!!@K!Ub @  @HX @HY@ U@ " @@HM @HN@  U@ " @@HB @HC@ U"0@ $U@H5U"HUbPUX@H2 U"`@ 㿈 Uap@H뀢 U쀢 U"@"a@㿐@GђbYN  . `@u@r@  U@^"㿐 @Gs 2    2U#@J㿐@ .!'`#ߒ#ڒ$#Ӓ$$%㿐 #N # L "U : \ L @c2 L  :"  ,@ L `"#,@ a(8 2 `" J `* 㿐N   @G` #(  " #`< 㿐N   @F` !#0`@ 㿐N  @F` !#,`@㿐@F` @F`( ΐ㿐!L  "@F` 1 !Uc @F!㿐ΐ" @F` 1 "Uc@F"㿐 q) _`%VN`R`a`A`c~;`d5`h1`H`n&`N`po`s`u`%5 U@#U#U#@F `@N@ "&@.@ @* U#@ߒ@F @E @F/@N ,@㿐 @Fu  @F@F @F   V`@E@Fb 㻈Q 0&#,P#� ''@FP Q!l&#('$ @FE V@ 0#&" '` @F8쀢 V@{ @0 &#㿈!    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Please specify its location. streamdgraminternal-0123456789incomplete line0123456789%s: not found: %m%s: not executablemiscdrexdrpc.rexd%s may be an insecure servicetcpd%s is recursively calling itself%s: file is set-uid or set-gid%s inserted before %s%s/%s/usr/sbin%s: not found in %s: %m%s: file lookup: %mrpc/tcp%s: cannot wrap rpc/tcp servicesout of memory Sorry, out of memory 01234567890./%s: not an internet address%s: host not found%d: not an internet host%s: hostname alias(official name: %s)host address %s->name lookup failedcommand: %s%s: world writable//etc/opt/WZVwrap/hosts.allow/etc/opt/WZVwrap/hosts.denyrmissing newline or line too long missing ":" separatorcannot open %s: %mmatched: %s line %dEXCEPTKNOWNLOCAL01234567890./ALLbad net/mask expression: %s/%sbannersdenyallowseveritynicesetenvrfc931twistspawnkeepalivelingerumaskgroupusermissing option namebad option name: "%s"option "%s" requires valueoption "%s" requires no valueoption "%s" must be at endoption: %s %s%s/%sr %s: %munknown group: "%s"setgid(%s): %munknown user: "%s"setuid(%s): %m%o%cbad umask value: "%s"%d%cbad linger value: "%s"setsockopt SO_LINGER %d: %msetsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %mbad nice value: "%s"nice(%d): %mtwist option in resident processtwist %s to %stwist_option: dup: %m/bin/shsh-ctwist_option: /bin/sh: %mbad rfc931 timeout: "%s"memory allocation failurelocal7local6local5local4local3local2local1local0cronuucpnewslprauthdaemonmailkerndebuginfonoticewarningerrcritalertemergbad syslog facility or severity: "%s"rule ends in ":"%s@%sunrecognized %%%c%percent_x: expansion too long: %.30s...%s=%scan't get client address: %mgetsockname: %mcan't verify hostname: gethostbyname(%s) failedlocalhosthost name/name mismatch: %s != %shost name/address mismatch: %s != %srequest_fill: invalid key: %d%d%s: %s, line %d: %s%s: %swarningerrorUnknown error %dYXaa K` Kt  Y 0 00<0H0T0`0l0x00000000000000 0,080D0P0\0h0t0000000000000~0{0x(0u40r@0oL0lX0id0fp0c|0`0]0Z0W0T0Q0N0K0H0E0B0?@(#) tcpdmatch.c 1.5 96/02/11 17:01:36@(#) fakelog.c 1.3 94/12/28 17:42:21@(#) inetcf.c 1.7 97/02/12 02:13:23O`OHO0O ONN @(#) scaffold.c 1.5 95/01/03 09:13:48 @(#) hosts_access.c 1.21 97/02/12 02:13:22, RR@(#) options.c 1.17 96/02/11 17:01:31= T07T(7T 8|T8T9T8S:pS;S< S9S<S6 S6<S6XW8T0W0W(W W0W8W@WxVVVVVVVVWxWpWhW`WXWPWHW@T@(#) eval.c 1.3 95/01/30 19:51:45unknownparanoid@(#) percent_x.c 1.4 94/12/28 17:42:371234567890!@%-_=+:,./abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ@(#) setenv.c 1.1 93/03/07 22:47:58@(#) socket.c 1.14 95/01/30 19:51:50@(#) workarounds.c 1.6 96/03/19 16:22:25@(#) update.c 1.1 94/12/28 17:42:56@(#) misc.c 1.2 96/02/11 17:01:29@(#) diag.c 1.1 94/12/28 17:42:20@(#) percent_m.c 1.1 94/12/28 17:42:37 K`Kt K YL YX Y ]aaa )a7aE\[\j]xH]'LLL](% (L$$| ]P$] !X]#.(p:a?(pN]&Vacr04l^ ]+2t,^/-03d/d79P=d6 ,8|X9_?< pM^`Z8(g^(&n;l|7h^X86X4:pD3_6<>$t9< __H<P)0_"7>FaNbVb`8'i@x``J`$Bd `%cEl0C Ea0$ Fpd<*Fp7>aX"EHT[IXhea"lIX{a'J@JJaKTaaZDt?p!]/\;>DI\PZW?TeEwgXmTG\+B\i@!?@DYL \`g` ^\ZhZ   8Z,^* 2Z9ZA@HXMJ@W38g@q[LyD0<HK`\$\H+C@\[)[4^Pil0\ i^IH"[)[2Z9j`E\lL\T\b'dkI8uYX ~!X$Zi@\Tj`[C [>d[d'`[\G,[ZP Z8gX!m@mD,a)3[X:+A\xH\R^gZlmLs\\<mP[]t [,[@aY ZZtiH, ] *x$ [ &YI -K :`  BZ I!P R\ Yg` ! 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J<p<<Q1.101^1\1X1811R1v2y2*2 }2,282Dg2Pe2\M2hN2t-2x2r2B22C2Z22 2H2233l353m3(34f3@23L3Xj3di3p63|+3Y3&3333]3h3L3A3,414 V4;4$404<k4HE4Tc4`K @D# @FK h@F@, @ "@@F@F㿐@/F/F⼮  `    㿐P@@FӒ /  &@ c !K@F̔  c@FĔ  @  @ @ݐ$K@\@F $K@T@F$K@L@F$K@D@F$K@<@F$K0@4@F$KP@,@F$Kp@$@F|㻐@@FuK@Fu!@Fu!㿈'H'L'P'T'XL㿐 q) _`%VN`R`a`A`c@;`d@5`h1`H`n@&`N`p@`s`u@`%@v K@!!K!K!@F @N@ "&@.@ @* K!@@E @E @E@N ,@㿐c K@Eؔ耢 @0@㻈F#&#,F#� ''@E֔ G &#('$ @E˚ K@Ð!0"&" 'b@E쀢 K@"0"&#㿈!    '@E@E . 㿈!J F @E @@@E . @ԐK" @.@E@  K@EbP K"``  , @@E{   `, @ 2, '@EbK"@U@@Ehbx 'ܐ$ @EG܁㿐@U@ 0 K@EHb *H"  ( @"(`"`"` " &"#  8 @"8`"`"` " &#@F#&#,F# �H &#,H �G"0㿐#8 ""@E" "# @E # @E  㿈 @E *`@Dǔ H  2&"H"&#(@D쀢   2 &"@K@Ő" @Dߔ  @K@"0`@D 6&# K@"@DŒ 㾀@DȒh K#@2 @DK@#) @D @D  @D @D K@y#0 @D @DK#X@k 㿐!#8 !` @D @Db . @D㿈!#8L!I@D쀢 D  @D耢 K#p@8*@ @,`@*`@Dc@  @Dj`?@D]`@Dc K# @"@D . @DO 㿐 `` @ 1#Kc  !` @ 1#Kc@D(#0!# *`@㿈 @C  K@"@C 0@Cߔ@C֒ 㿈 @D.   ) ` $ @ @C?'@ @C`     @ @C`$@ &  & hI l#L``2 * $$$$$$$$$@h`0`&`&"`&#    !!""`@CV , 㿐'H'L'P'T'XHcH@C7#<?& @CLb@C!L@C~` &"&#$㿐'H'L'P'T'XH㻐! !L`(@C_ L`@@CX x㿐'H'L'P'T'X L`HܖH㿐'H'L'P'T'X L`PΖH @C@?㿐@ ).#'# N@ %2 N` m2 a@6 L`*`@B@0L`X@Ca@C``@ ,㿐N   @Bb#(  " #`@ 㿐N   @Bb!#0`@ 㿐N  @Bb!#,`@㿐@Bb @B|b ΐ㿐!L  "@Bfb 1 "L`p @B"㿐ΐ" @BPb 1 #L`p@B#㿐@BL& x  L@B`L @B㿐 @Bo@'''"'  ה k'@Bk @Bk ` J@Bha@Bh"@'`'`'` '7@'`'`'` ' q7@BT@BT  ;@BL@BO  3L``@BH`@AА"@BD "`  @АL`̖@B8 `̀@`Ȁ@ @B, 2*'@B @B&@A +`㿐@/A/AԮ ? ???㿐㿠㿠gtimodclient address (%%a): %aclient hostname (%%n): %nclient username (%%u): %uclient info (%%c): %cserver address (%%A): %Aserver hostname (%%N): %Nserver process (%%d): %dserver info (%%s): %s unrecognized %%%c%percent_x: expansion too long: %.30s...timodcan't get client address: %mgetsockname: %mcan't verify hostname: gethostbyname(%s) failedlocalhosthost name/name mismatch: %s != %shost name/address mismatch: %s != %sinett_alloc: %scan't get client address: %sTI_GETMYNAME: %mfstat(fd %d): %msetnetconfig: %munable to identify transport protocolgetnetconfigent(%s): %scan't verify hostname: netdir_getbyname(%s) failedhost name/address mismatch: %s != %sUnknown TLI error %dUnknown UNIX error %drequest_fill: invalid key: %d%d%s: %s, line %d: %s%s: %swarningerrorUnknown error %d%s@%ssocket: %mr+fdopen: %m%u,%u %u , %u : USERID :%*[^:]:%255s0667FR ,T ,h \t 1lp$ 00<0H0T0`0l0x00000000000000 0,080D0P0\0h0t0000000000000~0{0x(0u40r@0oL0lX0id0fp0c|0`0]0Z0W0T0Q0N0K0H0E0B@(#) try-from.c 1.2 94/12/28 17:42:55@(#) fakelog.c 1.3 94/12/28 17:42:21@(#) percent_x.c 1.4 94/12/28 17:42:371234567890!@%-_=+:,./abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ@(#) fromhost.c 1.17 94/12/28 17:42:23@(#) socket.c 1.14 95/01/30 19:51:50@(#) tli.c 1.14 95/01/03 22:26:03@(#) workarounds.c 1.6 96/03/19 16:22:25@(#) update.c 1.1 94/12/28 17:42:56@(#) diag.c 1.1 94/12/28 17:42:20@(#) percent_m.c 1.1 94/12/28 17:42:37@(#) eval.c 1.3 95/01/30 19:51:45unknownparanoid@(#) rfc931.c 1.10 95/01/02 16:11:34 tp,T,h , 0 0 1l 4p666 (666DZi4pw`4p&l4%4'p4J5@'X6$5h%+650?NT"d]78g Ht X5"7("8,7(0T#\5$$07H<%$029%hC6"J%Ye68'l&{6`"'l:;6%)t<0))td++6,H(656BI3LZ3ath(pt42,'D<2(XT#\<A%3=@!(D0 2"3|0372tB1I8Q1V4\3@m2u}33p)X1&XD4p<,T@<32 2<04H!,*<42A&hHK? 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